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IN PURSUIT OF THE ELUSIVE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT: THE POLICE CHASE CASES 
RONALD J. BACIGAL * 
INTRODUCTION 
As we mark the fourth amendment's bicentennial, the amendment 
continues to generate completely new questions as well as innovative 
variations on the familiar themes of search and seizure. Much of the 
present uncertainty surrounding the amendment understandably arises 
from the difficulty of applying the 200-year-old document to a 
twentieth century society permeated with computers, cellular phones, 
spy-in-the-sky satellites, and other technological threats to privacy. 1 
It is surprising, however, to learn that the Supreme Court recently 
uncovered a fundamental fourth amendment issue unrelated to mod-
ern-day technological advances. The question of whether the amend-
ment encompasses "accidental seizures" allows us to momentarily 
discard the debate over the "War on Drugs"2 and other contemporary 
privacy issues, in order to refocus our attention on the fundamental 
purposes underlying the amendment. 
While welcoming the Supreme Court's invitation to reflect upon 
the underlying theme of the fourth amendment, I find it somewhat 
paradoxical to be asked to apply the modifier "accidental" to the 
term "seizure." The paradigmatic definition of search and seizure 
was formulated in Katz v. United States3 and Terry v. Ohio,4 in 
• Professor, University of Richmond. The author expresses his gratitude to 
Professor Gary C. Leedes and Professor Arnold H. Loewy who reviewed the initial 
draft of this article and offered helpful insights and criticism. Of course, any faults 
which remain are the sole responsibility of the author. 
1. "The 200 year march of science spanning our history as a free republic 
has equipped the police with tools that enable them to monitor our actions with 
startling efficiency." Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First 
Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 549 n.2 (1990). See generally Steinberg, Making Sense 
of Sense-Enhanced .Searches, 74 MINN. L. REv. 563 (1990). 
2. See, e.g., Winn, Seizures of Private Property in the War Against Drugs: 
What Process is Due?, 41 Sw. L.J. 1177 (1988). 
3. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
4. 392 U.S. l (1968). 
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which the Court held that the fourth amendment is applicable when-
ever government agents intrude upon a citizen's justifiable expectation 
of privacy or liberty. Katz and Terry indicated that there was no 
need to distinguish accidental from intentional seizures so long as 
the Court determined that there had been a governmental intrusion 
upon protected privacy or liberty interests. 5 
Without openly challenging the doctrinal definition set forth in 
Katz and Terry, the Court now suggests that a government agent's 
intent is an equally important benchmark for defining fourth amend-
ment seizures. This novel suggestion was prompted by the Court's 
consideration of two fatal automobile crashes that occurred during 
high speed pursuits by police officers.6 In Brower v. County of Inyo1 
the police erected a roadblock in hopes of convincing a fleeing felon 
to stop the chase upon sighting the barrier, 8 but the fleeing felon 
stopped only when he collided with the roadblock. In Galas v. McKee9 
the escaping suspect crashed and died after losing control of his 
vehicle. To a majority of the Court, these factual situations posed a 
new fourth amendment question: Can there be a seizure within the 
meaning of the amendment when a police officer's objective conduct 
plays a role in terminating a suspect's freedom of movement even 
though the suspect's loss of liberty does not come about in the 
manner intended by the officer? The Court answered its own query 
by declaring that the fourth amendment does not encompass ''the 
accidental effects of otherwise lawful government conduct" 10 and 
that there can be no seizure unless the police officer utilizes ''means 
intentionally applied" 11 to bring about the termination of the suspect's 
freedom of movement. 
The Court's focus on means intentionally applied is not a mere 
variation on the Katz and Terry standards for defining the coverage 
5. See supra notes 1-2. 
6. Conventional wisdom suggests that the fatal crashes in Brower and Galas 
are common-place occurrences. "High-speed pursuit is an exceedingly dangerous 
kind of police operation .... More often than not, a high-speed pursuit ends only 
when either the fugitive or the officer is involved in a collision, often a fatal one." 
A. STONE & s. DELUCA, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 414 (1985), quoted in Alpert & 
Dunham, Policing Hot Pursuits: The Discovery of Aleatory Elements, 80 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 534 (1989). A recent study by the California Highway 
Patrol, however, revealed that most pursuits are terminated voluntarily by the 
offender and that seventy percent of pursuits end without an accident. Alpert & 
Dunham, supra, at 526. 
7. 489 U.S. 593 (1989). 
8. The plaintiff in Brower alleged that the police concealed the roadblock 
in order to bring about the crash. See infra note 60. For purposes of its analysis, 
however, the Court assumed that "respondents here preferred and indeed earnestly 
hoped, that Brower would stop on his own, without striking the barrier. ... " 
Brower, 489 U.S. at 598. 
9. 801 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1986). See Brower, 489 U.S. at 545. 
10. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. · 
11. Id. at 597. 
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of the fourth amendment. Instead, the Justices have reformulated 
the amendment's scope by shifting the center of attention to the 
previously unaddressed factor of the governmental intent to bring 
about a seizure. 12 The first section of this article considers whether 
the police officer's intent 13 is an indispensable component of fourth 
12. Accord Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 721 F. Supp. 189, 192 (E.D. 
Ark. 1989); see Reed v. Hoy, 891 F.2d 1421, 1426 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The Brower 
analysis breaks down into a three-part· test: a seizure is a (1) governmental (2) 
termination of freedom of movement (3) through means intentionally applied."). 
Compare Landol-Rivera v. Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Brower, 
as establishing a constitutional distinction between police action directed toward 
producing a particular result and police action that simply causes a particular result) 
with Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (All injuries 
arising in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop must be analyzed under the 
fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures even if the plaintiffs 
were not the targets of the attempted seizure.). 
13. It is difficult to decipher precisely what form of intent Justice Scalia was 
discussing. See Keller v. Frink, 745 F. Supp. 1428 (S.D. Ind. 1990). In legal parlance, 
his use of terms such as "willful" detention, "desired," "sought," and "meant" 
results, as well as "designed" and "selected" means, connote a subjective state of 
mind. In normal usage, according to WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTION-
ARY, the word "intention" implies "little more than what one has in mind to do 
or bring about." Having authored an opinion replete with allusions to the police 
officer's subjective state of mind, Justice Scalia proclaimed that he did not think it 
"practicable" to inquire into subjective intent. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598. The 
concurring Justices commended their colleague for avoiding inquiries into subjective 
intent, although they questioned his introduction of the "concept of objective intent" 
as a standard for determining fourth amendment seizures. Brower, 489 U.S. at 600 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
It is not clear that Justice Scalia was formulating a concept of objective intent 
because his opinion does not employ the term, nor does he contest or endorse the 
concurring opinion's use of the term. If objective intent is the new litmus test for 
fourth amendment seizures, I confess that I am unable to locate any clarification 
of the term itself or any prior discussion of what role objective intent plays in 
defining fourth amendment seizures. "The reported cases all seem to look to 
subjective intent. However, the distinction between subjective and objective intent 
was not in issue in any of those cases." Keller v. Frink, 745 F. Supp. 1428, 1431 
(S.D. Ind. 1990). The closest analogy arises in the pretext arrest cases in which the 
lower courts have focused upon objective facts that establish probable cause for the 
arrest as distinguished from those subjective factors that actually prompted the 
individual officer to seize the suspect. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 
704, 708 (1 lth Cir. 1986) ("The proper inquiry is whether a reasonable officer would 
have made the seizure in the absence of illegitimate motivation."). See generally 
Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 17 U. 
MICH. J .L. REF. 523 (1984); Haddad, Pretextua/ Fourth Amendment Activity: 
Another Viewpoint, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 639 (1985). 
One can readily grasp the distinction between objective facts upon which a 
reasonably prudent officer might have acted (a hypothetical construct) and subjective 
factors which in reality motivated an individual officer. The distinction between 
subjective and objective intent, however, is more difficult to comprehend in light 
of the general understanding that the term intent normally betokens an existing state 
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amendment seizures. The second section of the article addresses the 
Court's efforts to define a seizure· by focusing upon the objective 
causal link between an officer's efforts to apprehend a suspect and 
the suspect's attempt to avoid apprehension. 
I. THE THRESHOLD OF THE AMENDMENT 
To describe police action as a search or seizure implies that fourth 
amendment activity is involved, but it does not suggest whether the 
search or seizure is reasonable or unreasonable. 14 Nonetheless, the 
courts sometimes allow the tail to wag the dog by answering the 
threshold question of the amendment's coverage only after looking 
ahead to the ultimate issue of whether a search or seizure can be 
deemed to be reasonable under the circumstances of the case. 15 Prior 
to the landmark decisions in Katz and Terry, there may have been 
some justification for this tail-wagging-the-dog approach. 16 Pre-Terry 
seizures of suspects were tested under formidable constitutional 
of mind rather than a hypothetical construct. 
The ambiguities of the Brower opinion suggest at least three plausible readings 
of Justice Scalia's allusions to intent: (1) despite his disclaimer, the Justice is in fact 
addressing subjective intent as a requirement for fourth amendment seizures. See 
Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 296 (8th Cir. 1989) (omitting any 
discussion of objective intent and holding that no seizure took place because "Officer 
Truska did not intend for the pursuit to end by means of an accident"); (2) the 
Justice is formulating a requirement for subjective intent but is suggesting that the 
"practicable" way to proceed is to examine the objective circumstances from which 
subjective intent may be inferred; or (3) in place of an inquiry into subjective intent, 
the Court will examine the objective circumstances in order to determine whether a 
reasonably prudent officer would have realized that his action would result in a 
seizure. 
Having admitted my own confusion over the Justice's terminology, the remain-
der of this article addresses both a subjective intent to seize and the reasonably 
prudent officer's perception of whether a seizure has taken place. 
14. Contra Michigan v. Chestnut, 486 U.S. 567, 570-72 (1988). 
15. The oral arguments in Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), 
demonstrate the Court's tendency to blur the existence of a seizure with the 
reasonableness of that seizure. During presentation of plaintiff's argument, counsel 
made it clear that he preferred not to explore the ultimate reasonableness of the 
seizure. But, assaulted by questions on this issue throughout his presentation, 
"counsel was at pains to assure the justices that the question was not before them 
at this time and a reversal of the lower court's decision would mean only that the 
reasonableness of the seizure could finally be put to the test." 44 CRIM. L. REP. at 
4149. When the justices continued to raise questions about the reasonableness of 
the seizure, counsel pleaded: "All we want, he reminded the justices, is for you to 
say that there was a seizure here so that we can explore the question of reasona-
bleness." Id. at 4150. 
16. In a broader context, Professor Bickel defended the Supreme Court's use 
of threshold determinations to avoid substantive issues. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 
1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1961). 
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standards17 that could not be satisfied in a variety of police-citizen 
encounters18 in which the police lacked probable cause for an arrest. 19 
In light of the heavy burden placed on police to justify seizures of 
citizens, there was a certain parity in requiring the suspect20 to meet 
a rigorous standard for establishing that a seizure had taken place. 21 
When Katz and Terry transformed the definition of search and 
seizure, the Court concomitantly adjusted the burdens of proof placed 
upon both police and suspects. The two cases expanded the definition 
of search and seizure to encompass previously excluded police activ-
ity, 22 thereby inqeasing the number of situations in which the suspect 
could demand that the police off er legal justification for their con-
duct. At the same time, Terry allowed the police to justify their 
conduct under a less demanding standard of constitutional reasona-
bleness. 23 In place of a rigid requirement of probable cause (reason-
able belieO, certain lesser intrusions upon privacy and liberty could 
now be justified by a lower standard of reasonable suspicion. 24 
17. For the most part the Court had treated the fourth amendment "as a 
monolith: wherever it restricts police activities at all, it subjects them to the same 
extensive restrictions that it imposes upon physical entries into dwellings. To label 
any police activity a 'search' or 'seizure' within the ambit of the amendment is to 
impose those restrictions upon it." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 388 (1974). 
18. See La Fave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, 
Peters, and Beyond, 67 Mien. L. REv. 40 (1968). 
19. "(A] perfectly reasonable apprehension of danger may arise long before 
the officer is possessed of adequate information to justify taking a person into 
custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime." Terry, 392 U.S. at 26-27. 
20. "The opinions of both Justice Brennan and Justice O'Connor, by their 
use of 'cf. ' citations, implicitly recognize that none of our prior decisions tells us 
who has the burden of proving whether [the plaintiff's] expectation of privacy was 
reasonable." Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 467 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
The Riley dissent, however, agreed with the concurring opinion "that the burden 
of alleging and proving facts necessary to show standing could ordinarily be placed 
on the defendant." Id. at 466 n. 7 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Past cases also generally 
assumed that the burden fell upon the defendant. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 
362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) ("Ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper to require of one 
who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant 
evidence that he allege, and if the allegation be disputed that he establish, that he 
himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy"); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. 128, 131 n.l (1978) ("The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden 
of establishing that his own fourth amendment rights were violated by the challenged 
search or seizure."). 
21. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Jones v. United States, 
362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
22. Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968) (stating that the fourth amendment 
applies to temporary detentions falling short of full custodial arrests); Katz, 389 
U.S. 347, 359 (1967), overruling Omstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) 
(stating that the amendment extends to electronic surveillance). 
23. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. 
24. "In Terry v. Ohio, we held that the police can stop and briefly detain a 
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The present Supreme Court, however, appears to have lost sight 
of Terry's even-handed approach to the fourth amendment. While 
continuing to lessen the government's burden to establish the consti-
tutional reasonableness of its conduct,25 there has been no corre-
sponding expansion of the suspect's zone of protected privacy and 
liberty. 26 Instead, the Court has narrowed the coverage of the fourth 
amendment by holding that more and more law enforcement activity 
is excluded from the definition of search and seizure. 27 This on-going 
contraction of the amendment's scope follows a pattern in which the 
facts of the particular case suggest that the police cannot justify their 
actions as constitutionally reasonable, yet the Court will conclude 
that the police conduct is a desirable part of the war on crime. 28 In 
person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported 
by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot,' even if the officer lacks 
probable cause." United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989). The 
"scaling down" of probable cause in search cases came in Katz's progeny. See 
Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 
1979 ILL. L.F. 763. 
25. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Court replaced the two-
pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), with a less-demanding 
totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining probable cause. The Court also 
lessened the probable cause requirement in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) 
(upholding the search of a government employee's office and desk based upon 
reasonable suspicion); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (upholding the 
search of a school· child based on reasonable suspicion); Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives Ass'n, 489 U. S. 602 (1989) (upholding drug testing of railroad engineers 
following accidents); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 1489 U.S. 
656 (1989) (upholding drug urinalysis of employees involved in drug interdiction or 
positions requiring the carrying of firearms). 
26. Faced with conflicting demands for "safe streets" and freedom of move-
ment on those streets, the Supreme Court "increasingly has opted in favor of public 
safety. It has done so by electing to raise the threshold of what is meant by a 
'seizure .... "' United States v. Barnes, 496 A.2d 1040, 1044 (D.C. 1985). 
27. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S 
207 (1986) (aerial surveillance of curtilage, not a search); New York v. Class, 475 
U.S. 106 (1986) (observation of vehicle identification number from outside the 
vehicle, not a search); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985) (examining wares 
exposed to the public, not a search); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) 
(trespass upon open field, not a search); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 
(1984) (chemical field test of substance contained in package previously opened by 
private carrier, not a search); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (canine 
inspection of luggage in public place, not a search); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 
(1983) (shining flashlight into automobile, not a search). 
28. "We would hesitate to declare a police practice of long standing 'unrea-
sonable' if doing so would severely hamper effective law enforcement." Tennessee 
v. Garner, 471 U.S. I, 19 (1985). See United States v. Notorianni, 729 F.2d 520, 
523 (7th Cir. 1984) (dissenting opinion) (The court's "modest fiction" that a suspect 
questioned by police will feel free to say nothing and move on "makes it possible 
to cope with drug traffic in a place like O'Hare airport."); see also supra note 26. 
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such situations the police conduct can receive Court approval only 
if it is placed beyond the coverage of the fourth amendment, thereby 
eliminating any requirement of constitutional reasonableness. 29 The 
result-oriented nature of the Court's approach allows it to tailor30 
the amendment's coverage by covertly determining whether the rea-
sonableness requirement can be satisfied before deciding whether to 
impose the requirement upon the police. 
The Court's efforts to narrow the coverage of the fourth amend-
ment have prompted some disingenuous decisions based upon the 
type of factual determinations that should play a relatively minor 
role in defining the amendment's scope. When the Court implies that 
surveillance by a helicopter triggers fourth amendment protections 
only when an unacceptable amount of dust is blown up by the 
helicopter ,31 or that airplanes, but not helicopters, "search" when 
they drop below an altitude of 1,000 feet, 32 the scope of the amend-
ment is made to turn upon minute factual differences. 33 The Court's 
misplaced reliance upon factual determinations manifests itself in the 
recent series of police "chase" cases34 that define the point at which 
a seizure occurs in the course of police pursuit of a fleeing suspect. 
Several of the chase cases involved unintended or unforeseen conse-
29. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
30. The suspicion is that the Court's hostility to the exclusionary rule leads 
it to cut back the scope of fourth amendment protections. See Joseph & Hunter, 
Circumventing the Exclusionary Rule Through the Issue of Standing, 10 J. CoNTEMP. 
L. 57 (1984); Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and 
Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1975). See also 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 156 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) ("If the Court is 
troubled by the practical impact of the exclusionary rule, it should face the issue 
of that rule's continued validity squarely instead of distorting other doctrines in an 
attempt to reach what are perceived as the correct results in specific cases."). 
31. Riley, 488 U.S. at 452 ("[T]here was no undue noise, no wind, dust, or 
threat of injury"). Compare Colorado v. Pollock, 796 P .2d 63 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1990) (distinguishing Riley and holding that a search occurred when the police 
helicopter, hovering at 200 feet, created "excessive noise") with Commonwealth v. 
Oglialoro, __ Pa. __ , 579 A.2d 1288 (1990) (A search occurred when a police 
helicopter, hovering at fifty feet, created a great deal of noise and represented a 
hazard to persons and property on the ground.). 
32. Riley, 488 U.S. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
33. See United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1982) (scope of the 
amendment increasingly turns upon minute factual differences). See generally Dwor-
kin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 
48 IND. L.J. 329, 366 (1973) (the Court must address fourth amendment protections 
in "bold, broad policy terms instead of asking what was reasonable under the 
circumstances .... ");Lafave, Being Frank About the Fourth: On Allen's "Process 
of 'Factualization' in the Search and Seizure Cases," 85 M1cu. L. REv. 427 (1986) 
(The establishment of fourth amendment categories is a process of factualization.). 
34. See Brower, 489 U.S. 593 (1989); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 
(1988); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 
57 (1924). 
80 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
quences of the chase,35 thus raising fundamental questions about 
whether the fourth amendment encompasses accidental seizures. Un-
fortunately, the Court has failed to address the issue with the kind 
of sweeping analysis ·utilized to mark the limits of the amendment 
in Katz and Terry. Instead, the Court has reduced the question of 
accidental seizures to a factual inquiry into (1) the pursuing officer's 
intent36 and (2) the causal link between the chase and the suspect's 
alleged loss of liberty. 37 This analysis, however, is flawed because 
the Court has failed to relate its view of intended consequences and 
accidental causation to the language of the amendment itself or to 
the policies and history surrounding the amendment. 
A. All Around the Fourth Amendment, the Police Chased the 
· Suspect . .... Where Is the Seizure? 
The first of the chase cases, Tennessee v. Garner, 38 arose when 
a police officer fired a fatal shot at a fleeing felony suspect. The 
threshold question of whether a seizure had occurred was disposed 
of in a single sentence: "[T]here can be no question that apprehension 
by the use of deadly force is a seizure . . . . ''39 After passing quickly 
over the threshold question of the amendment's coverage, the Garner 
Court centered its attention on the substantive issue of striking a 
constitutionally appropriate balance between law enforcement needs 
and the rights of suspects. 40 When the Court concluded that the need 
to apprehend fleeing felons does not "justify the killing of nonviolent 
suspects, " 41 the unrestricted use of deadly force was removed from 
the arsenal of police pursuit. The Court's willingness to address the 
reasonableness of police pursuit was eroded, however, in the subse-
quent chase cases when the Court invoked a grudging and rigid view 
of the amendment's scope. 
Garner was followed by Michigan v. Chesternut,42 a chase case 
that presented the Supreme Court with sharply contrasting theories 
for determining when police pursuit amounts to a fourth amendment 
seizure. The chase in Chesternut began with a police patrol car's 
approach to an intersection where the defendant was standing. When 
the defendant turned and ran, the patrol car drove alongside the 
35. See Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1989); Britt 
v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 721 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Ark. 1989). 
36. Brower, 489 U.S. 593, 598 (1989). 
37. Id. at 599. 
38. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
39. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7. 
40. Id. at 8. 
41. Id. at 10. 
42. 486 U.S. 567 (1988). 
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def endant43 until he discarded several packets of codeine that the 
police retrieved. When these facts were presented to the Supreme 
Court, the defendant argued that the initiation of a chase constitutes 
the litmus test for defining a seizure. 44 According to the defendant 
"any and all police 'chases' are fourth amendment seizures ... " 45 
and ''the police may never pursue an individual absent a particular-
ized and objective basis for suspecting that he is engaged in criminal 
activity."46 The government, on the other hand, maintained that "a 
lack of objective and particularized suspicion would not poison po_lice 
conduct, no matter how coercive, as long as the police did not 
succeed in actually apprehending the individual. " 47 According to the 
government, successful apprehension of the suspect is the determi-
native factor in defining seizures.48 
The Court refused to adopt either side's proposal for defining a 
seizure by reference to a single factual occurrence,49 whether the fact 
be pursuit itself or the actual apprehension of the suspect. Instead, 
the Court applied United States v. Mendenhall's50 test of whether 
the totality of the circumstances would lead a reasonable person to 
perceive that his freedom of movement had been constrained by the 
police.51 "Looking to· the reasonable man's interpretation of the 
conduct in question . . . . , " 52 the Court concluded that the police 
conduct in Chesternut could not have induced the defendant to believe 
that he was not free to disregard the presence of the police and go 
about his business.53 Because the Court ruled that no seizure took 
43. Id. at 569. The officer testified that "the goal of the chase was not to 
capture [the defendant], but to see where he was going." The Court noted that 
"the subjective intent of the officers is relevant to an assessment of the ·Fourth 
Amendment implications of police conduct only to the extent that that intent has 
been conveyed to the person confronted." Id. at 576 n.7. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 572. 
46. Id. See In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138, 140 (D.C. App. 1987) ("When the 
chase commences, the stop has begun."); Commonwealth v. Thibeau, 384 Mass. 
762, 429 N.E.2d 1009, 1010 (1981) ("(A] stop starts when pursuit begins."); People 
v. Washington, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1120, 1126, 236 Cal. Rptr. 840, 843 (Ct. App. 
1987) (Giving chase "in a manner designed to overtake and detain or encourage the 
individual to give up his flight is a detention."). 
47. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 572. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. 466 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
51. Mendenhall's reasonably prudent person test has been criticized as a legal 
fiction because "in fact, citizens almost never feel free to end an encounter initiated 
by a police officer and walk away." Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for 
Clarity in Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 437, 439 (1988). 
52. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574. 
53. Id. at 576. 
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place, 54 there was no need to determine whether the chase of the 
suspect was motivated by idle curiosity or by a legitimate govern-
mental interest. Thus, while Garner had given scant attention to the 
threshold question of defining a seizure55 and had focused on the 
substantive reasonableness of the police pursuit, 56 the Chesternut 
Court avoided the substantive question by ruling that there was no 
seizure. 
The most recent police chase case, Brower v. County of Inyo,51 
was generated by a factual situation in which a suspect was killed 
when he crashed into a police roadblock following a high speed chase 
over approximately twenty miles. 58 The suspect's heirs brought a 
section 198359 suit claiming that the police used brutal and unnecessary 
'physical force in establishing the roadblock60 and thereby effectuated 
an unreasonable seizure of the suspect. The court of appeals, how-
ever, refused to address the reasonableness of the alleged seizure 
because no seizure had taken place.61 According to the Ninth Circuit, 
"[p]rior to. [the suspect's] failure to stop voluntarily, his freedom of 
movement was never arrested or restrained," and "[h]e had a number 
of opportunities to stop his automobile prior to the impact. " 62 The 
court of appeals ruled that there was no loss of liberty during the 
chase itself and that the loss of liberty accompanying the crash was 
attributable to the suspect's own actions in continuing the chase.63 
54. Id. 
55. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1984). 
56. Id. at 7-20. 
57. 489 U.S. 593 (1989). 
58. Id. at 594. 
59. The statute provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress. 
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1988). 
60. Petitioners alleged that the police: (1) caused an eighteen-wheel tractor-. 
trailer to be placed across both lanes of a two-lane highway in the path of the 
suspect's flight; (2) effectively concealed this roadblock by placing it behind a curve 
and leaving it unilluminated; and (3) positioned a police car, with its headlights on, 
between the suspect's oncoming vehicle and the truck, so that the suspect would be 
blinded on his approach. Brower, 489 U.S. at 594. The Fifth Circuit referred to a 
similar arrangement as a "deadman" roadblock. Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 
1207 (5th Cir. 1985). The Fifth Circuit held that use of the roadblock constituted 
a seizure, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Brower to resolve the conflict 
among the circuits. Brower, 489 U.S. at 594-95. 
61. Brower v. Inyo County, 817 F.2d 540, 547 (9th Cir. 1987). 
62. Id. at 546. 
63. Id. 
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In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court cited 
Garner's which held that a police officer's fatal shooting of a fleeing 
suspect constituted a fourth amendinent seizure.64 The Court stated 
that: "Brower's independent decision to continue the chase can no 
more eliminate respondents' responsibility for the termination of his 
movement effected by the roadblock than Garner's independent 
decision to flee eliminated the Memphis police officer's responsibilty 
for the termination of his movement effected by the bullet.' '65 
While holding the police accountable for the fatal crash in 
Brower/16 the Court exonerated the police from all responsibility for 
a suspect's loss of control of his vehicle during the chase in Galas.67 
The Court distinguished the two cases by resurrecting a pre-Terry 
case once regarded principally as an example of the open fields 
doctrine68 rather than as a chase case. The newly discovered chase 
case, Hester v. United States,69 involved a revenue agent's pursuit of 
the defendant and his accomplice after seeing the suspects obtain 
containers thought to be filled with moonshine whisky. 10 During their 
flight the suspects dropped the containers which the agent recovered. 71 
A unanimous Court in Hester held that "[t]he defendant's own acts, 
and those of his associates, disclosed the jug, the jar and the bottle-
and there was no seizure in the sense of the law when the officers 
examined the contents of each after it had been abandoned. " 72 After 
recasting the Hester decision as a chase case, the Brower Court 
announced that the result in Hester would have been quite different 
if the revenue agent had shouted: "Stop and give us those bottles, 
in the name of the law!"73 According to Brower, "[t]hen the taking 
of possession would have been not merely the result of government 
action but the result of the very means (the show of authority) that 
the government selected, and a Fourth Amendment seizure would 
have occurred. " 74 
The Court's attempt to distinguish Brower from Hester and Galas, 
as well as its reinterpretation of Hester as a chase case, raises an 
obvious question: Why didn't the chase in Hester constitute a man-
ifest "show of authority" that implicitly commanded the suspect to 
64. Brower, 489 U.S. 593, 595 (1989) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 
1 (1985)). 
65. Brower, 489 U.S. at 595. 
66. Id. at 599. 
67. Id. at 595 (citing Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1986)). 
68. Id. at 597-98. 
69. 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
70. Id. at 58. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. 
74. Id. at 597-98. 
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"[s]top and give us those bottles, in the name of the law?"75 Under 
Chesternut's reasonably prudent person test,76 it is difficult to envision 
that the suspects or the revenue agent in Hester perceived the chase 
as anything other than a show of authority intended to obtain the 
containers. The Brower Court parenthetically conceded as much by 
acknowledging that the containers in Hester ''were unquestionably 
taken into possession as a result (in the broad sense) of action by 
the police .... " 77 For fourth amendment purposes, however, the 
Court declined to accept this "broad sense" of causal connection 
between the government's action and the defendant's counteraction. 78 
At the same time that it rejected an overly broad definition of 
causation, the Brower Court refused to "draw too fine a line, or we 
will be driven to saying that one is not seized who has been stopped 
by the accidental discharge of a gun with which he was meant only 
to be bludgeoned, or by a bullet in the heart that was meant only 
for the leg. " 79 
Having framed the issue as a question of drawing an appropriate 
line somewhere between overly broad and unacceptably narrow con-
cepts of causation, 80 the Brower Court failed to identify the meth-
odology underlying its line-drawing in the chase cases. The Court 
merely announced its conclusion that: 
We think it enough for a seizure that a person be stopped by the 
very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve 
that result. It was enough here, therefore, that . . . Brower was 
meant to be stopped by the physical obstacle of the roadblock-
and that he was so stopped. 81 
The Court's reference to the "physical obstacle of the roadblock"82 
suggests that the Court elected to focus on the mechanical83 cause of 
75. Id. at 597. In Brower there was no verbalization of the officer's desire 
that the suspect "Stop in the name of the Law!" Although such an intent was 
manifest from the circumstances of the chase itself, one wonders why the officer's 
intent in Hester was not equally manifest. Ambiguity, however, remains even when 
the officers verbally communicate their desire that the suspect stop. For example, a 
call of "Police, wait a second. We want to talk to you" did not implicate the 
fourth amendment, according to Richardson v. United States, 520 A.2d 692, 697 
(D.C. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987), but a call of "Come here, police 
officer" did implicate the amendment according to Johnson v. United States, 468 
A.2d 1325, 1327 (D.C. 1983). 
76. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 569, 574 (1988). 
77. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 598-99. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 599. 
82. Id. 
83. The Brower Court required that the police intend "to produce a stop by 
physical impact." Brower, 489 U.S. at 598. This language suggests that the Court 
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the stop, a point addressed in the latter section of this article. The 
reference to whether the police "meant" to stop the suspect "by" 
use of the roadblock84 indicates the newly discovered significance of 
the police officers' intent. In an apparent effort to banish any doubt 
as to the Court's heightened consideration of police intent, the Court 
embarked upon a discussion of hypothetical85 situations designed to 
demonstrate that "even [when] there is a governmentally caused and 
governmentally desired termination of an individual's freedom of 
movement,"86 a constitutional seizure occurs "only when there is a 
governmental termination of freedom of movement through means 
intentionally applied.' '87 
The Brower Court's concern for "means intentionally applied"88 
is an ill-conceived approach to determining the reach of the fourth 
amendment. The most puzzling aspect89 of the Brower opinion is its 
is limiting its view of causation to "direct cause" or "purely mechanical rules 
[which] produce absurd results." R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 779, 787 
(3d ed. 1982). See Landol-Rivera v. Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir. 1990) 
("Each of the Supreme Court's recent cases on the fourth amendment ... involved 
scenarios in which the individual claiming to have been seized had been the direct 
object of police intervention~"). Brower's analysis ignored "indirect causes" and 
the multiple components of causation that coalesce to produce a given result. See 
infra text accompanying note 201. 
84. Brower, 489 U.S. at 599. 
85. There is a temptation to dismiss Justice Scalia's opinion in Brower as 
the hypothetical musings of a law professor turned Supreme Court Justice. There 
is, however, the possibility that far more is going on here than the positing of 
harmless hypotheticals. In Michigan v. Chesternut the majority left "to another day 
the determination of the circumstances in which police pursuit could amount to a 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment." Chesternut, 486 U.S .. at 576 n.9. Justice 
Scalia joined a concurring opinion in Chesternut observing that: 
[N]either "chase" nor "investigative pursuit" need be included in the 
lexicon of the Fourth Amendment .... It is at least plausible to say that 
whether or not the officers' conduct communicates to a person a reasonable 
belief that they intend to apprehend him, such conduct does not implicate 
Fourth Amendment protections until it achieves a restraining effect. 
Id. at 577. 
The Chesternut concurrence, combined with Justice Scalia's use of hypotheticals 
in Brower and his approval of Galas, indicate an attempt by the Justice to foreclose 
Chesternut's assertion that "police pursuit could amount to a seizure .... " Four 
Justices in Brower concurred only in the judgment and noted that Justice Scalia's 
"dicta seem designed to decide a number of cases not before the Court. ... " 
Brower, 489 U.S. at 600 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Supreme Court recently 
granted certiorari in California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 38 (1990) to consider the 
question: "ls physical restraint required for seizure of person under Fourth Amend-
ment?" 
86. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Justice Scalia's allusions to intent are arguably ambiguous. See supra 
note 13. Nonetheless, Brower purported to follow precedent by rejecting any attempt 
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attempt to promulgate a constitutional distinction between a desired 
result and the desired or intended means of achieving that result. An 
evaluation of several hypotheticals that isolate and distinguish the 
Court's use of the terms "intentional means" and "intended results" 
should clarify the nomenclature on which the chase cases are based. 
Hypothetical One 
Assume that the police enter what they honestly, but mistakenly, 
believe to be an abandoned apartment in order to look for drugs 
which they find and retrieve. 
This hypothetical posits an intentional act (the police enter by 
means of their willed bodily movements}90 and an intended or desired 
result (the view of the apartment and the retrieval of contraband}. 91 
The only unintended facet of this hypothetical is that the police do 
not intend that a search or seizure take place because they believe 
that the defendant has abandoned any expectation of privacy with 
regard to the apartment or the drugs. The hypothetical illustrates the 
need to distinguish between a police officer's intent to perform a 
volitional act and his recognition of the legal significance attaching 
to that act. 
Unless some new form of good faith exception92 is created, 
entering an apartment and securing drugs must be defined as a search 
to examine the subjective motivation of the police. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. 
Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989) (Subjective motivations of the individual officers have no 
bearing on whether a particular seizure is unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment.); see also Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., 
dissenting) (Inquiry into the subjective state of mind of police officers would be a 
costly "misallocation of judicial resources."). But see Butterfoss, supra note 51, at 
442 (proposing a per se rule defining a seizure on the basis of the police officer's 
intent to initiate contact with a citizen for purposes of investigating that individual's 
complicity in criminal activity). If the officer's intent to restrain the suspect were 
irrelevant, then in some cases "the perception rather than the fact of a restriction 
on freedom of movement" would determine the scope of the fourth amendment. 
Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of "Stop" and "Arrest, " 
43 Omo ST. L.J. 771, 814 (1982). 
90. There is general agreement that an act should be defined as a movement 
of a part of the body. See MODEL PENAL CooE § 1.13(2) ("bodily movement whether 
voluntary or involuntary"); S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (1979) ("bodily 
movement or activity"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 (1965) (The word 
"act" is used "to denote an external manifestation of the actor's will and does not 
include any of its results even the most direct, immediate and intended."); 0. 
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 54 (1881) (An "act" is a "muscular contraction."). 
91. The Brower Court noted that "the detention or taking itself must be 
willful." Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. 
92. In Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) and United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Court created a good-faith exception for searches 
pursuant to a warrant. 
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and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.93 Otherwise, 
the amendment becomes a prohibition merely of calculated attempts 
to violate the constitutional ban against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. While the intentions underlying police conduct may be 
significant in the context of the amendment's exclusionary rule,94 the 
Court has never interpreted the scope of the amendment to require 
a knowing and willful intent to violate the law.95 In Garner, for 
example, the pursuing officer's use of deadly force comported with 
practices derived from .common law and approved by a substantial 
number of state legislatures.96 Despite the officer's reliance upon legal 
precedents97 and his good faith belief in the legality of his actions,98 
the United States Supreme Court concluded that such practices were 
unreasonable under the fourth amendment.99 
So long as Katz and Terry remain in effect, a search or seizure 
under the fourth amendment is properly defined by the Court's 
acknowledgment of an expectation of privacy or liberty100 which 
society recognizes as justifiable. 101 It is society's intent to protect 
privacy apd liberty from intrusive government action, not the intent 
of the police, that determines the reach of the fourth amendment. 
In deciphering the constitutional dimensions of society's justifiable 
expectations, the Court is the ultimate lexicographer. Individual 
officers or even reasonably prudent officers simply cannot dictate to 
93. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
94. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989). 
95. See id. at 1872 ("An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth 
Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an 
officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitu-
tional.") (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). 
96. The Court found that the common-law rule "allowed the use of whatever 
force was necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon .... " Garner, 471 U.S. 
at 12. Further, the Court noted that the officer "was acting under the authority of 
a Tennessee statute and pursuant to Police Department policy." Id. at 4. 
97. TENN. CODE ANN. §40-7-108 (1982) provides that "[i]f, after notice of 
the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer 
may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest." 
98. See supra note 96. 
99. See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (striking down the 
long-standing practice of warrantless arrests in the suspect's dwelling). 
100. In the context of the police chase cases, the term liberty encompasses 
freedom of movement. United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980). 
See Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on 
the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1258 (1990). In a broader context, the term liberty 
encompasses an individual's right of autonomy-the right to live one's life without 
arbitrary phys~cal interference by the state. See Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 14 
COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1415 (1974). · 
101. "[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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the Court a judicial definition of search and seizure according to 
what they think about the constitutional concept. 
Although Brower declared that "[v]iolation of the Fourth Amend-
ment -requires an intentional acquisition of physical control," 102 the 
statement should not be read as an indication that the police must 
comprehend that their exercise of physical control is legally defined 
as a seizure. 103 Something less than a knowing intent to violate the 
Constitution will suffice to trigger fourth amendment coverage. 
Hypothetical Two 
Assume that a police officer standing in front of a private dwelling 
is shoved through the door of the dwelling and falls upon a suspect 
who is holding contraband drugs. 
While the first hypothetical posited an intentional act and an 
intended result, the second hypothetical posits, from the police of-
ficer's standpoint, unintentional involvement in a physical event 
coupled with an unintended result. This situation depicts a non-search 
and a non-seizure because there is an absence of any intentional 
(volitional) act104 performed by a government agent. 105 Although the 
suspect's privacy has been invaded by the police officer's physical 
presence in the dwelling, the government is no more responsible for 
this invasion of privacy than it is responsible for a private citizen 
who breaks into another's dwelling and discloses the fruits of his 
search to the police. 106 In either case, while the sovereign is the 
102. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. 
103. See Reed v. Hoy, 891 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1989) (A police officer 
maintained that no seizure took place because he shot the suspect in self-defense 
and not for purposes of effectuating an arrest or other stop. The court held that, 
regardless of the officer's motivation, the acquisition of physical control over the 
suspect constituted a fourth amendment seizure.). Accord Keller v. Frink, 745 F. 
Supp. 1428 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (A game warden shot at an automobile for the purpose 
of marking it for later identification. His bullet hit one of the auto's occupants, 
with the result that the vehicle stopped, and all those inside were arrested.). 
104. "By 'events' jurists mean those occurrences which take place independent 
of the will. By 'acts' those which are subject to the control of the human will and 
so flow therefrom. Acts, then, are exertions of the will manifested in the external 
world." R. POUND, READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW, 
513 (3rd ed. 1927). See J. MILL, A SYSTEM OF Lome, 59 (1873) (Volition is one of 
the constituents of positive action.); see also authorities cited supra note 90. 
105. The hypothetical assumes that the police officer was pushed by a private 
citizen. If he were pushed by another police officer, there would be a volitional act 
by a government agent. 
106. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 
U.S. 465 (1921). "[T]he Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, 
even an arbitrary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative .... " 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989). 
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fortuitous beneficiary of a non-governmental act, the fourth amend-
ment is limited to regulating governmental activity. 107 
Although the Brower Court's analysis is flawed in other respects, 
the Court correctly recognized that the word seizure "can hardly be 
applied to an unknowing act.'.' 108 The fourth amendment addresses 
conduct that is wrongful only if done by the government, but in the 
absence of volitional conduct by government agents no purpose is 
served by extending the amendment to the government's "accidental" 
involvement in intrusions upon a suspect's liberty. 
The above hypotheticals involving a volitional1°9 and an 
accidental1 10 entry of the suspect's apartment set the parameters for 
defining fourth amendment intent. 111 The first hypothetical demon-
107. The fourth amendment's "origin and history clearly show that it was 
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority .... " Burdeau v. 
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). See generally Amsterdam, supra note 17. 
108. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. 
109. See supra, p. 86. 
110. See supra, p. 88. 
111. The hypotheticals involved two possible combinations of the factors of 
intentional conduct and an intended or desired result. Hypothetical one addressed 
the presence of both factors while hypothetical two addressed the absence of both 
factors. There are two other possible combinations of conduct and corresponding 
result which may exist. 
For example, consider the situation in which a result was desired but no 
volitional act occurred. Because this scenario requires postulating a desired result 
free of any physical conduct by police, the hypothetical facts necessarily take on a 
far-fetched nature much like Justice Scalia's hypotheticals in Brower. Brower, 489 
U.S. at 596-97. One can formulate such facts, however, by drawing upon what 
must be the secret dream of frustrated police officers. Assume that a major drug 
dealer has just been acquitted due to the legalistic maneuverings of a "sleazy" 
defense counsel. As the disheartened arresting officer stands in the courtroom, he 
vows that some day, some way, he will vanish this scum (the drug dealer, if not 
the lawyer) from the face of the earth, whereupon the drug dealer promptly drops 
dead at the officer's feet. Whatever the tabloids might headline about the officer's 
psychic powers, the Court will hold the fourth amendment inapplicable in the 
absence of volitional conduct by the officer. 
In the final scenario, the act, but not the result, was intended. For this 
hypothetical, assume that the police fire at a fleeing suspect, but the bullet strikes 
a hostage held by the suspect. See Landol-Rivera v. Cosme, 906 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 
1990). The lower court held that the hostage had been seized by the police because 
the officers deliberately fired their weapons at the car containing the hostage, and 
the shooting resulted in the hostage's loss of liberty. Id. at 793. The First Circuit 
reversed the lower court on grounds that police action simply causing a particular 
result must be distinguished from police action directed toward producing a particular 
result. Id. at 795. According to the First Circuit, unless the restraint of liberty 
resulted from· an attempt to 'gain control of the individual, there has been no fourth 
amendment seizure. Id. 
What takes Brower beyond the four addressed combinations of act and result 
·is the Court's discussion of an additional factor, i.e., the intent to utilize conduct 
as a means of bringing about a desired result. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97. According 
to Brower, unless the means are intentionally applied, no fourth amendment seizure 
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strates that something less than a knowing intent to violate the 
Constitution will suffice to trigger fourth amendment coverage, 112 
and the second hypothetical demonstrates that the amendment re-
quires something beyond the government's unwitting involvement in 
an intrusion upon privacy and liberty interests. 113 If the first two 
hypotheticals accurately establish the boundaries for a proper defi-
nition of fourth amendment intent, the third hypothetical considers 
what intermediate form of intent is required to trigger the amend-
ment's coverage. 
Hypothetical Three 
Assume that the pursuing officer in Brower did not order a 
roadblock, but instead intended to continue the chase until this show 
of authority persuaded or intimidated the suspect to stop voluntarily. 
Assume further that in the course of the chase, the officer rounded 
a blind curve and crashed into the suspect's vehicle which had stopped 
due to mechanical failure. 
The question posed by this hypothetical is whether the fourth 
amendment will apply to a result which was not achieved in the 
precise manner that the government agent intended. The Brower 
decision appears to exclude the above hypothetical from fourth 
amendment coverage because of the absence of a perfect match 
between the intended means and the actual means of terminating the 
suspect's freedom of movement.1 14 If the suspect had stopped his car 
because of the intimidation created by the chase, the intended means 
and the actual means would coincide and a seizure would exist 
according to the Court's interpretation of Hester. 115 Similarly, if the 
police had intended to collide with the suspect's vehicle, there would 
occurs "even whenever there is a governmentally caused and governmentally desired 
termination of an individual's freedom of movement .... " Id. at 597. 
112. See supra pp. 86-88. 
113. See supra pp. 88-90. 
114. In the broad sense the police set an instrumentality (the police car) into 
motion for the purpose of stopping the suspect. But in the narrow sense the police 
car was intended to intimidate the suspect, not to run over him. As the Brower 
Court noted: "In marked contrast to a police car pursuing with flashing lights, ... 
a roadblock is not just a significant show of authority to induce a voluntary stop, 
but is designed to produce a stop by physical impact if voluntary compliance does 
not occur." Brower, 489 U.S. at 598. This situation is not unlike Justice Scalia's 
hypothetical in which "a serial murderer for whom there was an outstanding arrest 
warrant" and who "in the process of running away from two pursuing constables," 
is apprehended when "a parked and unoccupied police car slips its brake and pins 
[the fleeing suspect] against a wall .... " Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. Justice Scalia 
maintained that the unintended method of terminating the suspect's freedom of 
movement would not constitute a seizure. Id. 
115. Hester, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). See supra text accompanying note 74. 
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again be a perfect match between intent and result, and a seizure 
would occur. 116 Under the facts of this hypothetical, however, the 
officer's physical collision with the suspect is contrary to the officer's 
intent to intimidate the suspect into a voluntary stop. According to 
Brower, no seizure occurs when there is a failure to match the 
intended means with the actual means of terminating the suspect's 
freedom of movement. 117 
As justification for its novel treatment of accidental seizures, 118 
the Brower Court opined that the fourth amendment encompasses a 
willful detention or taking119 and a "misuse of power" 120 but "not 
the accidental effects of otherwise lawful conduct." 121 The Court, 
however, neglected to define these terms. If the Court uses the term 
"willful detention" to denote any detention resulting from a voli-
tional act (willed bodily movement), 122 then the latter hypothetical 
posits a detention resulting123 fi;om the officer's volitional conduct in 
chasing the suspect. If, on the other hand, the terms "willful deten-
tion" or "misuse of power" mean that the officer or a reasonably 
prudent officer must be aware that he is intruding upon the suspect's 
liberty interests, such a requirement must be rejected under the 
analysis of the first hypothetical. 124 The Court's final statement that 
the amendment does not address the "accidental effects of otherwise 
lawful government conduct" 12s involves a sleight-of-hand machination 
which assumes away the very issue under consideration. 
116. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 597 (If a police vehicle "had pulled alongside 
the fleeing car and sideswiped it, producing the crash, then the termination of the 
suspect's freedom of movement would have been a seizure."). 
117. Id. The Court observed in Brower that the officers in Galas "sought to 
stop the suspect only by the show of authority represented by flashing lights and 
continuing pursuit," whereas the suspect was actually stopped "by a different 
means-his loss of control of his vehicle and the subsequent crash." Id. 
118. Prior to Brower, the Court considered a form of unintended search and 
seizure under the rubric of inadvertent plain view. A plurality of the Court in 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire suggested that an anticipated or intended plain view 
seizure may taint otherwise lawful actions by the police. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In 
promulgating a constitutionally significant link between intended seizures arid oth-
erwise lawful conduct, however, the Coolidge Court did not address the reverse 
question of whether there is a similarly significant relationship between unintended 
seizures and otherwise unlawful conduct. The full ramifications of the "inadver-
tence" requirement under the plain view doctrine were never addressed by the 
Supreme Court, and the inadvertence requirement was eventually abandoned. Horton 
v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990). 
119. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. 
120. Id. at 596 (citing Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927)). 
121. Id. 
122. See supra note 90. 
123. The detention also results from a suspect's volitional conduct in seeking 
to avoid apprehension. The allocation of responsibility between the police and the 
suspect is discussed in the second section of this article. See infra text accompanying 
note 189. 
124. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
125. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. 
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If "lawful conduct" denotes lawfulness under substantive criminal 
law, e.g., whether a statute authorizes or prohibits high speed chases, 126 
Oliver v. United States121 teaches that common-law or statutory 
provisions do not dictate the scope of the fourth amendment. Unless · 
Oliver has been overruled sub silento, the Court ·must be using the 
term lawful conduct as a synonym for constitutional conduct. But 
to say that the fourth amendment does not apply to the accidental 
effects of otherwise "lawful conduct" is a tautology. When there is 
no unlawful or unconstitutional intrusion upon privacy or liberty, 
there is no constitutional violation that can contaminate the physical 
seizure of citizens or . their property. Once the Court determines or 
assumes that the police conduct is constitutionally lawful, it is con-
stitutionally irrelevant whether the effects of that conduct are acci-
dental or intentional. 128 
The Brower Court's reference to lawful conduct129 fails to distin-
guish between a situation in which the police conduct is deemed 
constitutionally lawful because there has been no intrusion upon 
privacy or liberty interests (the threshold question)130 and a situation 
in which an intrusion may have taken place, but the intrusion is 
lawful because it satisfies the amendment's reasonableness require-
ment (the substantive question). 131 In the latter case, the Court has 
once again bypassed the threshold question of the amendment's scope 
by looking ahead to the reasonableness of the government's action. 132 
In the former case, the Court has failed to define a seizure without 
reference to the ultimate question of the seizure's lawfulness or 
reasonableness. The Brower allusion to the accidental effects of 
otherwise lawful conduct thus avoids the fundamental question of 
whether the fourth amendment encompasses a situation in which a 
police officer's volitional act (whether ultimately reasonable or un-
reasonable) results in an accidental intrusion upon the suspect's 
freedom of movement. 
In fact, Brower's majority directly addressed this fundamental 
question only in the context of the historical fact that ''the writs of 
126. See Alpert & Dunham, Policing Hot Pursuits: The Discovery of Aleatory 
Elements, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521 (1989) (discussing the need for legal 
and administrative control of high-speed pursuit). 
127. 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (A criminal trespass into open fields was not an 
intrusion upon privacy for fourth amendment purposes.). 
128. See Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2309-10 (1990) ("[Nlo addi-
tional Fourth Amendment interest is furthered by requiring that the discovery of 
evidence be inadvertent."). 
129. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596 (The Supreme Court noted that the fourth 
amendment addresses "misuse of power" and not the effects of otherwise lawful 
governmental conduct.). 
130. Id. at 595. 
131. Id. at 595-96. 
132. See supra note 15. 
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assistance that we~e the principal grievance against which the Fourth 
Amendment was directed . . . did not involve unintended conse-
quences of government action." 133 The Court's reading of history, 
however, does not answer the question of accidental seizures. While 
condemning the intentional seizures associated with writs of assis-
tance, 134 the constitutional framers 135 were never called upon to con-
sider the question of accidental seizures. Given the climate of hostility 
surrounding writs of assistance and general warrants, 136 it is unlikely 
that the framers would endorse the Court's view that no seizure took 
place in Ga/as131 when the suspect crashed while trying to avoid the 
police. If Galas were transported back to the time of the writs of 
assistance controversy, 138 one could contrive a situation in which a 
customs inspector directs a royal frigate to stop and board a colonial 
merchant vessel. The merchant vessel flees into shallow waters where 
it crashes on a reef causing the demise of the crew. Would the 
founding fathers have been content to ignore the incident because 
the customs inspector meant no physical harm to the merchant, or 
would the colonists have demanded to know the custom inspector's 
justification for initiating the pursuit of the merchant? 
One of the most odious features of writs of assistance was "the 
unbridled discretion given public officials to choose targets of the 
searches .... " 139 Thus, history indicates that the American colonists 
were concerned with and sought protection against the arbitrary 
exercise of government power as well as protection against intentional 
misconduct by government officials. 140 When the framers of the 
fourth amendment guaranteed ''the right of the people to be secure 
133. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. (quoting T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 301-02 (1883)) 
(acknowledging that the seizure clause of the fourth amendment does not encompass 
unintended consequences of governmental actions nor did the general warrants issued 
by Lord Halifax in the 1760s which spawned the first and only major search-and-
seizure litigation in the English courts). 
136. See generally id. 
137. See supra text accompanying notes 9-11. 
138. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. 
139. Hufstedler, Invisible Searches for Intangible Things: Regulation of Gov-
ernmental Information Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1483, 1487 (1979). 
140. See Katz, Reflections on Search and Seizure and Illegally Seized Evidence 
in Canada and the United States, 3 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 103, 109-14 (1980) (The fourth 
amendment eliminated the broad intrusions associated with general warrants and 
writs of assistance and replaced them with limited intrusions based upon the probable 
cause and warrant requirements in addition to an overall requirement of reasona-
bleness.); see also Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the 
Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1229, 1236 (1983) ("[V)irtually every significant pre-
revolutionary search or seizure involved a nonspecific or arbitrarily obtained war-
rant."). 
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against unreasonable searches and seizures," they were not 
equating the reasonableness of police pursuit with the absence of 
malicious intent. 141 It is fallacious to impart to the framers a desire 
to confine the amendment to a prohibition of only the most egregious 
abuses associated with eighteenth century writs of assistance. In light 
of the Court's acknowledgement that it "has not simply frozen into 
constitutional law those law enforcement practices that existed at the 
time of the Fourth Amendment's passage," 142 the Court must look 
beyond specific historical practices to discern the broader purposes 
underlying the creation of the amendment. 
According to Katz and Terry, the fundamental purposes of the 
amendment are reflected in the twin predicates that trigger its appli-
cation-intrusions upon privacy or liberty interests brought about by 
governmental action. 143 Both predicates are met when our hypothetical 
police officer unintentionally crashes into the suspect's vehicle, thereby 
bringing about a convergence of volitional police conduct and a 
resulting intrusion upon the citizen's liberty interests. The Brower 
Court went beyond Katz and Terry when it suggested that the 
concurrence of these twin predicates does not constitute a seizure 
unless the two predicates are linked by an intent to bring about the 
intrusion "through means intentionally applied. " 144 While Katz and 
Terry undoubtedly assumed that the predicates must be linked in 
some fashion, 145 the Katz and Terry Courts never addressed the 
nature of that connection. Brower is the first Supreme Court case 
to focus upon the causal connection between governmental action 
and a loss of liberty and the first case to suggest that the government 
agent's intent is the vital link between the two. 146 
In the absence of clear precedent, one can only speculate as to 
what prompted the Court to create a requirement that seizures be 
141. "It is apparent that in order to satisfy the 'reasonableness' requirement 
of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual 
determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government ... is not 
that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable." Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2800 (1990). 
142. · Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980). See also Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910): 
Id. 
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. 
Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than 
the mischief which gave it birth .... In the application of a constitution, 
therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what 
may be. 
143. See Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 367. 
144. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597 (italics omitted). 
145. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 2 ("(A]n arrest is a[n] ... intrusion upon 
individual freedom."); Katz, 289 U.S. at 350 (The amendment "protects individual 
privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion."). 
146. 489 U.S. at 598-99. 
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brought about "through means intentionally applied." 147 Perhaps the 
Brower Court balked at the prospect of extending the fourth amend-
ment to accidental seizures and thereby further punishing the consta-
ble for well-intentioned blunders. If the Brower decision were 
influenced by the Court's hostility to the exclusionary rule148 or its 
reluctance to extend section 1983 to encompass mere negligence, 149 
the Court has lost sight of its limited task in defining the threshold 
requirements for a search and seizure. Merely acknowledging that 
the threshold may be crossed by accidental intrusions upon privacy 
and liberty does not commit the Court to punishing the police for 
accidents. The coverage of the amendment is only the preliminary 
inquiry. 150 The reasonableness or unreasonableness of the policeman's 
conduct151 and the application of the exclusionary rule152 remain 
separate issues for the Court's determination. 
If, for example, our hypothetical police officer's crash into the 
suspect's vehicle were to be classified as a seizure, the reasonableness 
of that seizure hinges upon striking the appropriate balance between 
the justification for the chase and potential threat of the chase to 
the suspect's liberty. 153 In the event that the Court strikes the balance 
in favor of the governmental interest underlying the chase, the Court 
would sanction the reasonableness of the officer's actions. But the 
Court would do so by issuing a limited ruling that condones only a 
particular specimen of accidental seizure. 154 A decision on the sub-
stantive reasonableness of a specific form of accidental seizure is 
147. In Daniels v. Williams, the Court held that the due process clause is not 
implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to 
life, liberty, or property. 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). The Brower Court, however, 
addressed the unintended means of bringing about an intended loss of liberty. 
Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. 
148. See supra note 30. Although the exclusionary rule is not germane in 
section 1983 cases like Brower, the constitutional definition of a seizure is equally 
applicable to criminal prosecutions. Brower interchangeably cites criminal cases (e.g., 
Hester) and section 1983 cases (e.g., Garner) to support a generic definition of 
accidental seizures which would then apply to criminal prosecutions and thereby 
affect the operation of the exclusionary rule. See Michigan Dep't State Police v. 
Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485 (1990) (quoting Brower's definition of a seizure within 
the context of sobriety checkpoints). 
149. See infra note 169. 
150. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16. 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28. 
152. See supra note 148. 
153. See infra text accompanying note 269; see also Roach v. City of Fred-
ericktown, 882 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1989); Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 721 F. 
Supp. 189 (E.D. Ark. 1989). After expressing reservations about Brower's definition 
of accidental seizures, both courts assumed that a seizure took place and upheld 
the reasonableness of the seizure. 
154. See, e.g., Roach, 882 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1989); Britt, 721 F. Supp. 189 
(E.D. Ark. 1989). 
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fundamentally distinct from Brower's universal dictate that the 
threshold of the fourth amendment never encompasses the unintended 
consequences of governmental action.m Applying Brower's inflexible 
constitutional dogma to the hypothetical leads to the startling con-
clusion that because the officer "didn't mean it," no seizure of a 
person occurred even though the officer ran over and killed the very 
suspect whom the officer was pursuing. 
The Court can avoid such nonsensical results by discarding the 
Brower majority's categorical rejection of accidental seizures156 in 
favor of the concurring opinion's recognition that "[t]he intentional 
acquisition of physical control of something is no doubt a charac-
teristic of the typical seizure, but I am not entirely sure that it is an 
essential element of every seizure or that this formulation is partic-
ularly helpful in deciding close cases. " 157 The concurring Justices 
refused to join the majority in elevating a characteristic of a typical 
seizure to the level of a constitutional prerequisite for application of 
the fourth amendment. 158 Unlike the majority opinion, the concurring 
opinion holds open the possibility of extending the amendment to 
the atypical159 ·accidental seizure whenever necessary to achieve the 
primary goals of the amendment. 
Consider the differing results when Brower's majority and con-
curring opinions are applied to our hypothetical set out above, with 
one last fact added to the situation. Assume that the police officer 
initiated the chase of the suspect because the officer did not approve 
of the political bumper sticker on the suspect's vehicle. According 
to the Brower majority, if the officer had intended to run over the 
suspect, a seizure would result, and Garner would require the Court 
to balance the intentional use of deadly force against the justification 
for using the force. 160 Under the facts of this hypothetical, however, 
the accidental use of deadly force remains beyond the scope of the 
155. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 600 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
158. Id. 
159. Accidental seizures may be atypical, but they are not rare occurrences. 
Numerous accidental injuries arise from the countless incidents in which the state 
and its citizens interact. See, e.g., Landol-Rivera v. Cosme, 906 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 
1990) (bullet intended for fleeing suspect struck. the suspect's hostage); Roach v. 
City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1989) (Police pursuit of fleeing felon 
caused the felon to collide with an innocent citizen's vehicle.); Fernandez v. Leonard, 
784 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1986) (shooting of unarmed hostage); Grandstaff v. City of 
Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985) (intentional, though mistaken, shooting of 
innocent bystander); Keller v. Frink, 745 F. Supp. 1428 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (A bullet 
intended to mark an automobile for identification struck an occupant of the vehicle.); 
Br.itt v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 721 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (A citizen was 
killed in car crash following a police officer's pursuit of a car thief.). 
160. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
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fourth amendment and beyond the scope of judicial review .161 Thus, 
the Brower majority would refuse to entertain allegations of a bla-
tantly unjustified use of deadly force so long as the officer "didn't 
mean" to hurt anyone. 162 When attaching so much significance to 
intent, the Brower majority ignored the maxim that "though boys 
throw stones at frogs in jest, the frogs die in earnest." Regardless 
of the officer's intent, the injury inflicted on the suspect is a risk 
that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable seizures seeks 
to avoid163 and, thus, within the scope of the fourth amendment. 
In contrast to the Brower majority's view of intentional seizures, 164 
the concurring opinion suggests that an examination of the officer's 
intent "adds little to the well-established rule that 'a person has been 
"seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in 
view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable 
person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' " 165 In 
the hypothetical situation above, there can be no doubt that a person 
run over by a police cruiser would reasonably perceive that his 
freedom of movement has been constrained. Having crossed this 
threshold requirement for a seizure, 166 the concurring opinion would 
examine the reasonableness of the seizure167 and address the issue 
that the Brower majority would refuse to reach-the underlying 
justification for the chase. The Brower majority's aversion to ex-
amining the underlying justification for a police pursuit sanctions 
what Terry condemned-the government's attempts "to isolate from 
constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between the 
policeman and the citizen.'' 168 
If the Court is to remain faithful to the rudimentary purposes 
of the fourth amendment, it should not refuse to examine claims of 
improper police conduct merely because that conduct accidentally 
caused a citizen's loss of liberty.169 The link between creation of risk 
161. Absent a violation of the fourth amendment, the Court may not invoke 
its supervisory powers to exclude evidence obtained by offensive police conduct. 
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 733 (1980). "[A]ll claims that law enforcement 
officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, 
investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the 
Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than under a 'substan-
tive due process' approach." Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989). 
162. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97. 
163. "[T]he interest in freedom from bodily harm surely qualifies as an interest 
in 'liberty'." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 341 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
164. Brower, 489 U.S. at 598-99. 
165. Id. at 600 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 600-01 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
168. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17. 
169. I do not suggest that the fourth amendment applies to all improper police 
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and realization of harm is often fortuitous, yet the government's 
freedom to engage in certain conduct is restricted in the first instance 
to avoid certain harms to citizens. The intentional or fortuitous 
occurrence of those harms triggers fourth amendment protections in 
the form of a judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of the police 
officer's conduct. 110 
B. Summary 
The hypotheticals presented in this article serve to isolate and 
distinguish the terms that the Brower Court failed to define, i.e., 
"willful detention, " 111 "desired termination of an individual's free-
dom of movement," 172 "an intentional acquisition of physical 
control"173 and "means intentionally applied. " 174 The first hypothet-
ical considered a volitional act (entering the apartment) and a physical 
result (taking control of the suspect's property) that were both 
intended, although the police officer did not intend to bring himself 
within the coverage of the amendment. 175 When there is both an 
intentional act and an intended result that qualifies as an intrusion 
conduct causing physical harm to a citizen. "[l]t is perfectly clear that not every 
injury in which a state official has played some part is actionable under" section 
1983. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980). A state Jaw tort suit, not 
federal civil rights litigation, is the appropriate vehicle for compensation of a citizen 
accidentally run over by a police car on a frolic to the doughnut shop. See Paul v. 
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698 (1976) (Section 1983 does not create a cause of action for 
survivors of an innocent bystander negligently killed by a sheriff driving a government 
vehicle.); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1985) (Negligent acts by 
government officials, though causing loss of liberty, are not actionable under the 
due process clause.). 
When, however, the police engage in volitional conduct for the very purpose 
of apprehending the suspect, it matters not that the conduct succeeds in apprehending 
the suspect in some unintended or unforeseen manner. "It is intervention directed 
at a specific individual that furnishes the basis for a Fourth Amendment claim."" 
Landol-Rivera v. Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 796 (1st Cir. 1990) (Unless the restraint of 
liberty resulted from an attempt to gain control of the individual, there has been 
no fourth amendment seizure.). 
170. It is inevitable that the police response to violent crime will at times 
create some risk of injury to suspects and innocent bystanders. The reasonableness 
of creating such risks depends upon the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., 
Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 721 F. Supp. 189, 195 (E.D. Ark. 1989). The 
court found that it is reasonable for an officer to turn on the flashing lights and 
siren in an attempt to induce the suspect to stop and for an officer to pursue a 
fleeing car for a short distance in light traffic to see if the suspect would desist 
from flight. At some point, however, continued pursuit at high speeds in heavy 
traffic might become unreasonable. Id. 
171. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. 
172. Id. at 597. 
173. Id. at 596. 
174. Id. at 597. 
175. See supra pp. 86-88. 
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upon protected privacy or liberty interests, the Court must charac-
terize the situation as a search and seizure. 176 The scope of the fourth 
amendment cannot be made dependent upon the legal judgments of 
police officers, whether the officers act in good faith or otherwise. 
In contrast to the first hypothetical, the second hypothetical 
situation posited an absence of volitional conduct coupled with an 
unintended result. m There is no search or seizure in this situation 
because the fourth amendment is limited to regulating governmental 
activity, 178 and in this hypothetical there is no volitional act performed 
by a government agent. It is in this limited context-the absence of 
volitional conduct by government agents-that one can accurately 
speak of the government's accidental involvement in any intrusion 
upon privacy or liberty as falling beyond the scope of the fourth 
amendment. · 
Finally, the third hypothetical suggested a volitional act coupled 
with an intent to bring about the termination of the suspect's liberty, 
but the officer did not intend the precise manner of termination. 179 
Although the hypothetical contains the fundamental predicates that 
have traditionally triggered fourth amendment coverage-government 
action180 and a citizen's loss of liberty181-the Brower Court went 
further and addressed the previously unstated assumption that the 
predicates must be linked in some fashion. 182 The Brower Court, 
however, took a false step by requiring the two predicates be linked 
by a government agent's intent to bring about a loss of liberty 
through means intentionally applied. 183 Instead of evaluating intent, 
the Court should have examined the objective causal connection 
between the predicates. The nature of that causal connection is 
discussed in the second section of this article. 
II. RELATING CAUSATION CONCEPTS TO THE PURPOSES OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The first section of this article isolated and focused upon the 
issue of the governmental intent to accomplish a seizure. 184 The 
176. See, e.g., Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. 
177. See supra pp. 88-90. 
178. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV; see also supra note 107. 
179. See supra pp. 90-91. 
180. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468 (1989) (declaring that fourth 
amendment protections do not apply, absent governmental action which could be 
characterized as a search and seizure). 
181. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (A seizure occurs when a 
person's freedom is restrained.). 
182. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597-98. 
183. Id. at 597. 
184. See supra pp. 76-99. 
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analysis assumed that the suspect suffered a loss of liberty and that 
the loss could be attributed to the physical conduct of government 
agents. 185 The causal link between government conduct and the sus-
pect' s loss of liberty was most easily discerned in the first 
hypothetical186 in which only the police engaged in affirmative voli-
tional conduct. What remains for consideration is the additional issue 
that troubled the Brower Court-a situation in which the suspect is 
an active participant and, as a result, clouds the objective causal 
connection between the governmental conduct and the suspect's loss 
of liberty. For example, the police in Brower erected a roadblock in 
hopes that a visual sighting of the barrier would induce the suspect 
to stop voluntarily .187 The suspect, however, elected to continue his 
flight until he crashed into the roadblock. 188 In determining the cause 
of the crash, the. Brower Court was forced to allocate responsibility 
between the police and the suspect, both of whom played an active 
role in bringing about the alleged seizure. 
The proper allocation of responsibility among multiple actors in 
a chase scenario is an integral part of the Court's analysis of the 
chase cases. 189 Each case involved a combination of arguably de-
pendent and independent volitional conduct by both the police and 
the suspect. 190 It is impossible, however, to reconcile the chase cases 
by reference to a consistent191 theory that would explain how the 
. Court apportions responsibility among the participants in a chase 
scenario. In particular, the Court has failed to address the extent to 
185. See Landol-Rivera v. Cosme, 406 F.2d 791, 793 (1st Cir. 1990) (situation 
in which a policeman's bullet, intended to stop the fleeing felon, struck a hostage). 
The court stated that Brower had carefully distinguished between police action 
directed toward producing a particular result, and police action that simply caused 
a particular result. Compare id. at 795 with Keller v. Frink, 745 F. Supp. 1428, 
1432 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (A seizure occurred when a shot intended to mark a vehicle 
for identification struck an occupant of the vehicle.). 
186. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
187. See supra note 8. 
188. See id. 
189. If the police officer's subjective intent is a relevant factor in defining a 
seizure, Chesternut may be distinguished from the other chase cases on grounds that 
the police intended to follow the suspect and not to apprehend him. See supra note 
13. In Chesternut itself, the Court noted that "the subjective intent of the officers 
is relevant to an assessment of the Fourth Amendment implications of police conduct 
only to that extent that the intent has been conveyed to the person confronted." 
Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 576 n.7. 
190. The Ninth Circuit characterized the situation in Brower as involving "the 
combined intentional conduct of both victims and defendants." Brower, 817 F.2d 
540, 546 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 489 U.S. 593 (1989). 
191. In Chesternut the Court stated that the test for fourth amendment seizures 
"calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the next," in order 
that the police may "determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will 
implicate the Fourth Amendment." Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574. 
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which one party may be held accountable for eliciting responsive 
conduct192 from another. In Brower and Garner each suspect's deci-
sion to take flight did not relieve the police of responsibility for their 
own actions. 193 Yet, in ·Hester and Chesternut, each suspect's decision 
to discard the containers that he was carrying exempted the police 
from all accountability for their conduct in initiating the chase. 194 
A consideration of whether one person is culpable for the reac-
tions elicited from another195 must begin with the requirement for a 
scientific connection (the but-for test) between cause and effect. 196 In 
the fourth amendment context, the Court has acknowledged the 
requirement for a but-for causal connection when formulating the 
independent discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. 197 Thus, a 
chase that begins with the issuance of an arrest warrant in New York 
plays no part in the independent and simultaneous decision of a 
suspect to surrender to the police in California. 
Doctrines such as the independent discovery rule198 illustrate the 
manner by which a scientific analysis of causation serves as a 
screening process for eliminating unnecessary factors from responsi-
bility for the result. 199 When irrelevant factors are removed, the 
192. Hester, Garner, Chesternut, and Brower involved the suspects' response 
of flight while Hester and Chesternut, in addition, involved the suspects' discarding 
containers that the police later retrieved. 
193. Brower and Garner might have been distinguished from each other under 
the "last clear chance doctrine." In Garner, the police performed the last of a 
sequence of acts when they fired the fatal shot after the suspect engaged in the act 
of flight~Garner, 471 U.S. at 4-whereas in Brower, the suspect performed the 
final act of driving into the roadblock previously erected by the police. Brower, 817 
F .2d at 452. This article maintains that a decision to invoke or ignore causation 
theories such as the "last clear chance doctrine" must be related to the purposes 
underlying the fourth amendment. See infra text accompanying note 204. 
194. Hester and Chesternut might have been distinguished from each other by 
examining the subjective intent of the pursuing officers. While the revenue agents 
in Hester sought to obtain the containers, the police in Chesternut merely intended 
to see where the suspect was going. The Court's recognition of subjective intent is 
subject to debate. See supra note 13. 
195. See Terry, Proximate Consequences in the Law of Torts, 28 HARV. L. 
REv. 10 (1914). The lower court in Brower maintained that the combined intentional 
conduct of the police and the suspect "can be fully evaluated under ordinary tort 
principles without any need to reach out for a bizarre definition of 'seizure.' " 
Brower, 817 F.2d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1987). 
196. "Common law approaches to causation often require proof of but-for 
cause as a starting point toward proof of legal cause." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
109 S. Ct. 1775, 1807 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra 
note 83, at 772; Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 369, 
375 (1950). 
197. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988); Segura v. United States, 
468 U.S. 796, 805 (1983). 
198. Segura, 468 U.S. at 805. 
199. Scientific causation functions in a negative manner to exclude certain 
102 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW' [Vol. 58 
remammg factors are identified as the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the result. Thus, the · complete scientific cause of any 
effect is the sum of the necessary antecedents.200 In Brower, the 
police officer's decision to initiate the chase, the police officer's 
decision to erect the roadblock, and the suspect's decision to avoid 
apprehension and drive down the path to his death were all necessary 
antecedents for the resulting stop. By singling out the roadblock in 
Brower as the2°1 cause of the crash, the Court moved beyond the 
realm of scientific analysis to address the concept of legal202 causation. 
While science provides a pool of candidates or antecedents from 
which the Court can choose, 203 the Court must resolve the issue of 
legal causation by forming a judgment that, among the many ante-
cedent causes, one particular cause will best serve the purposes for 
which the relevant law was adopted. 204 
The manner in which the purposes underlying the fourth amend-
ment has guided the analysis of legal causation is reflected in the 
Court's interpretations of the amendment's exclusionary rule2°5 and 
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. 206 From a purely scientific 
standpoint, the outer reaches of the exclusionary rule can be deter-
mined by the existence of a but-for causal connection between police 
conduct and the seizure of evidence. The Court, however, limits an 
overly mechanical application of the exclusionary rule by invoking 
policy considerations that mark "the point at which the detrimental 
forces from responsibility for the result. It eliminates candidates from responsibility; 
it does not resolve the question of who is ultimately responsible. D. DRESSLER, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 160 (1987). 
200. "All antecedents which contribute to a given result are, as a matter of 
fact, the causes of that result." R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 598 (1957). See also 
Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARv. L. REv. 103, 104 (1911). 
201. While the Supreme Court focused on the police roadblock as the cause 
of the crash, the Ninth Circuit held that the suspect's flight was the cause of the 
crash. Brower, 817 F.2d at 546 ("Brower's seizure, if any, was the result of his 
own effort in avoiding numerous opportunities to stop."). 
202. The American Law Institute states that the term "legal cause" is superior 
to the term "proximate cause" because the latter places undue emphasis upon the 
nearness in time or space. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 (1965). See also 
Smith, supra note 200, at 106-08. 
203. "The question is not what philosophers or logicians will say is the cause. 
The question is what the courts will regard as the cause." Smith, supra note 200, 
at 104. 
204. "Here is the key to juridical treatment of the problems of causation. We 
pick out the cause which in our judgment ought to be treated as the dominant one 
with reference, not merely to the event itself, but to the jural consequences that 
ought to attach to the event. .. B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 83 
(1928). 
205. The exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence secured through an illegal 
search and seizure. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
206. Fruit of the poisonous tree is evidence obtained by an unlawful search. 
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
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consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the 
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost. " 207 
This article suggests that the Court's consideration of fundamental 
fourth amendment policy should be extended to the question of 
identifying seizures caused by the government.208 
The lack of attention to fundamental fourth amendment policy 
is evident in the Brower Court's focus upon unduly formalistic 
concepts of causation. Faced with a choice between what the Court 
referred to as a "broad" sense of causation209 and "too fine" a 
sense of causation, 210 the Court failed to articulate how the primary 
purposes underlying the amendment would guide the selection of the 
proper constitutional view of causation. To paraphrase Professor 
Perkins, whether one uses the term broad cause, narrow cause, 
proximate cause, or some equivalent, "the idea sought to be expressed 
is 'legally-recognized cause,' which should be promptly tested by the 
question-legally recognized for what purpose? " 211 
The dual purposes of the fourth amendment are to protect 
individual rights of privacy and liberty and to regulate certain forms 
of governmental conduct. 212 What is missing from the chase cases is 
a discussion of whether those purposes are best served by a broad 
or narrow definition of the causal link between police pursuit and a 
suspect's loss of liberty. When faced with a choice between conflicting 
theories of causation, the Court must assess the manner in which 
each theory contributes to or detracts from the purposes underlying 
the amendment. 
207. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). See 
also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 (1978) ("[W]e have declined to 
adopt a 'per se or "but-for" rule' that would make inadmissible any evidence, 
whether tangible or live-witness testimony, which somehow came to light through a 
chain of causation that began with an illegal arrest."). 
208. "[A] legal cause is a cause which stands in such a relation to its 
consequences that it is just to give legal effect to the relation: meaning by 'just,' 
not merely fair as between the parties, but socially advantageous, as serving the 
most important of the competing individual and social interests involved." Edgerton, 
Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 343, 348 (1924). 
209. The court rejected the "broad" sense of causation in Chesternut and 
Hester. See Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1989); Hester, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
210. The Court rejected "too fine" of a sense of causation in Brower and 
Garner. See Brower, 489 U.S. ·593 (1989); Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
211. PERKINS & BoYCE, supra note 83, at 776. See also Malone, Ruminations 
on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 67 (1956) (The causation theory "can be 
given a direction that is consistent with the policy considerations that underlie the 
controversy."). 
212. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REv. 349 (1974); Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the 
Fourth Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 529 (1978). 
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A. Choosing Between a "Broad" and "Narrow" Sense of 
Causation 
Defining seizures according to a narrow sense of causation213 
benefits the government by relieving it of the burden of justifying 
its conduct as constitutionally reasonable. 214 This burden is no longer 
onerous under the present Court's utilization of a sliding scale of 
reasonableness. 215 The price for that benefit is the significant cost 
associated with removing vast areas of governmental conduct from 
judicial scrutiny. 216 
The need for judicial review of certain types of governmental 
activity, i.e., searches and seizures, lies at the heart of the fourth 
amendment. 217 The peril of diminishing this aspect of the amendment 
was illustrated in Galas v. McKee2 18 in which the Sixth Circuit held 
that no seizure took place when a fleeing suspect lost control of his 
vehicle and crashed during a high speed chase by the police. 219 Brower 
endorsed the Sixth Circuit's narrow view of causation and its decision 
to single out the suspect's flight as the cause of the suspect's loss of 
liberty when he crashed.220 The suspect's actions, however, tell only 
213. Hester, 265 U.S. at 58 (no seizure when police officers examined bottles 
of moonshine tossed away by fleeing defendants as the defendants' own act disclosed 
the evidence). 
214. Once the Court classifies the government action as a non-seizure, "it is 
of course of no consequence whether or not there was probable cause." United 
States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375, 380 n.5 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 
(1974). 
215. See Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of 
Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763 (1979). 
216. To label any police activity a "search" or "seizure" within the ambit 
of the amendment is to impose [the reasonableness] restriction[s] upon it. 
On the other hand, if it is not labeled a "search" or "seizure," it is 
subject to no significant restrictions of any kind. It is only "searches" or 
"seizures" that the fourth amendment requires to be reasonable: police 
activities of any other sort may be as unreasonable as the police please to 
make them. 
Amsterdam, supra note 212, at 388. See also supra note 161. 
217. See Amsterdam, supra note 212; see also Murphy, Encounters of a Brief 
Kind: On Arbitrariness and Police Demands for Identification, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
207, 209-10 (suggesting that the Court extend fourth amendment to "brief encoun-
ters" which do not meet the test of Terry). 
218. 801 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1986). See Brower, 489 U.S. at 595. 
219. Galas, 801 F.2d at 203. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 595. 
220. The Sixth Circuit noted that when the suspect crashed he was not free 
to walk away. "This restraint on plaintiff's freedom to leave, however, was not 
accomplished by the show of authority but occurred as a result of plaintiff's decision 
to disregard it." Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1986). The Supreme 
Court agreed that the police "sought to stop the suspect only by the show of 
authority represented by flashing lights and continuing pursuit," whereas the suspect 
was actually stopped "by a different means-his loss of control of his vehicle and 
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half the story. By focusing solely upon the suspect's conduct, the 
courts effectively foreclosed any inquiry into the reasonableness of 
the police conduct that motivated the suspect's flight. What if, 
however, the officer in Galas had chased the suspect because the 
suspect was black?221 This speculative possibility remains pure con-
jecture because the police are not required to expose or explain their 
justification for a chase when the Court concludes that the threshold 
requirement for a seizure has not been satisfied. 222 
Exempting law enforcement officers from any requirement to 
justify pursuit culminating in a citizen's loss of liberty impedes the 
fourth amendment's goal of regulating police misconduct. 223 The 
judiciary can exercise meaningful review of police pursuit only when 
the underlying justification for a chase is revealed and subjected to 
judicial scrutiny.224 Accordingly, a "broad" view of the causal link 
between police pursuit and a suspect's loss of liberty facilitates a 
broader review of police conduct. The most far-reaching view of 
causation is the but-for test, which, when applied to situations like 
Galas, reveals the causal link between the chase and the suspect's 
crash. 225 I.e., but for the police officer's initiating efforts to appre-
hend the suspect, there would have been no flight by the suspect; 
the subsequent crash." Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. Both courts failed to consider 
whether the flashing lights and continuing pursuit played any part in causing the 
suspect's loss of control of his vehicle. If the suspect's conduct were the most 
immediate cause of the crash, did the police cause the suspect's conduct? See infra 
text accompanying note 226. 
221. See Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdirections of a Constitutional 
Right of Privacy, 26 REc. N.Y.B.A. 546, 552 (1971) (Governmental conduct that is 
not classified as a search or seizure is immunized from scrutiny even though it 
results from such illegitimate or even malicious motives as governmental curiosity, 
a desire to gather and report interesting information, or personal distaste for the 
political philosophies or lifestyles of certain citizens.). In Garner, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the Memphis police department employed deadly force in a racially 
discriminatory manner. Fyfe, Tennessee v. Garner: The Issue Not Addressed, 14 
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 721 (1986) (" '[T]he facts establish an administration 
... with an evil eye and an unequal hand' against blacks."). 
222. If the police conduct is not designated a search or seizure, the fourth 
amendment is totally inapplicable and "the law does not give a constitutional damn" 
about whether the police conduct complied with any of the amendment's provisions. 
Moylan, The Fourth Amendment Inapplicable vs. the Fourth Amendment Satisfied: 
The Neglected Threshold of "So What?," 1977 S. ILL. U.L.J. 75, 76. By placing 
the police conduct beyond the reach of the fourth amendment, the courts "leave 
the individual at the mercy of the police" and "deny the protection (of the 
amendment) to those most in need of it-those individuals who have not given the 
police probable cause to act." Mascolo, The Role of Functional Observation in the 
Law of Search and Seizure: A Study in Misconception, 71 D1cK. L. REv. 379, 418-
19 (1967). 
223. Terry, 392 U.S. at 12. 
224. Id. at 15. The courts still "retain their traditional responsibility to guard 
against police" misconduct that "trenches upon personal security without the ob-
jective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires." Id. 
225. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). 
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but for the flight, there would have been no automobile crash 
terminating the suspect's liberty.226 According to the but-for analysis, 
while the suspect's decision to flee may be (in spatial terms of time 
and distance) the most immediate cause of the crash, the chase itself 
is the cause of a cause.227 
The flow of but-for causation originates with the chase in Galas 
and can be interrupted only if the Court invokes the doctrine of 
supervening causation228 by characterizing a suspect's decision to flee 
as a supervening and totally autonomous act. 229 Distinguishing be-
tween situations in which flight is "an exercise of autonomy" 230 and 
those in which flight is a foreseeable response to police pursuit is a 
particularly slippery endeavor. Thus in Brower, the Court rejected 
the Ninth Circuit's characterization of flight as an autonomous act 
but simultaneously approved the Sixth Circuit's decision to attribute 
the crash in Galas to the "plaintiff's decision" to take flight. 231 At 
226. But-for causation is a hypothetical construct. In determining whether 
a particular factor was a but-for cause of a given event, we begin by 
assuming that that factor was present at the time of the event, and then 
ask whether, even if that factor had been absent, the event nevertheless 
would have transpired in the same way. 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1785 (1989). 
227. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 83, at 791. 
228. One form of supervening cause arises when a person initiates a chain of 
causation to which another responds in an unforeseen and absurd fashion. PERKINS 
& BOYCE, supra note 83, at 790-97. When assessing the foreseeability or reasona-
bleness of the suspect's response to police pursuit, it is important to remember that 
the Court has recognized that no seizure occurs so long as the ·suspect is allowed 
to exercise his right to ignore the police and "walk away." United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 5441 553 (1980). The exercise of the right to "walk away" 
by means of high-speed flight in an automobile· may be unreasonable for purposes 
of assigning fault within the context of tort law or substantive criminal law, but it 
is a separate question whether the method of exercising that right is so absurd that 
it removes the citizen from the protections of the fourth amendment. This article 
suggests that the threshold of the amendment is not dependent upon tort law or 
substantive criminal law concepts of reasonable conduct. Instead, the threshold of 
the amendment should be interpreted to facilitate consideration of the constitutional 
significance of both the suspe.ct's and the police officer's actions. "It is not necessary 
to say that one has a constitutional right to hide from the police; it is sufficient to 
say that no government right exists to demand the physical presence of the accused 
at any given time or at any . . . given place, except upon a showing of sufficient 
justification." Williamson, supra note 89, at 813; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 
("right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free 
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law") (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 
(1891)). 
229. See infra note 230. 
230. The Ninth Circuit characterized Brower's flight as "an exercise of auton-
omy" that could not be attributed to the police. Brower, 817 F.2d at 546. 
231. "This restraint on plaintiff's freedom to leave, however, was not accom-
plished by the show of authority, but occured as a result of plaintiff's decision to 
disregard it." Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1986). 
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best, the term "supervening cause" may be an acceptable short-hand 
for describing situations in which one person makes a de minimis 
contribution to causing another's conduct.232 At its worst, however, 
an overly solicitous application of the concept of supervening cau-
sation forces the Court to ignore the catalyst that prompted a 
suspect's decision to flee. The doctrine of supervening causation is, 
thus, counterproductive to the purposes of the fourth amendment 
because the doctrine effectively shields the underlying police conduct 
from judicial review. In order to serve the amendment's purpose of 
regulating governmental conduct, the Court should decline to import 
the doctrine of supervening causation into fourth amendment analysis 
and should recognize that chase-and-crash situations like Galas satisfy 
the but-for test of causation. 
Nonetheless, the Court has opined that the but-for test is merely 
"a starting point"233 for analysis of causation. The Court may rightly 
demand some limitation on a purely mechanical view of causation 
in order to avoid absurd results. 234 This article suggests that the 
fourth amendment's threshold requirement for a seizure is met when-
ever police pursuit significantly contributes235 to a suspect's loss of 
232. See infra note 234. 
233. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1807 (1989) (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting). 
234. Consider the following scenario: 
John stops his vehicle at a red light and notes that a police cruiser has pulled 
into the lane behind him. To the objective observer there is nothing sinister about 
the appearance of the police car-no flashing lights or menacing gestures. John, 
however, has an irrational fear of the police, and concludes that he is about to be 
arrested. He prefers death to apprehension, and therefore slits his own throat. 
In this situation there is (1) volitional police conduct (driving the police cruiser); 
(2) an ultimate loss of freedom of movement brought on by death; and (3) a but-
for factual connection between the first two occurrences. There is, however, a 
qualitative disparity between the risks to citizens created by the police action and 
the specific injuries that result from the action. When this occurs, but-for causation 
lacks legal significance. See Jeffries, Damages for Constitutional Violations: The 
Relation of Risk to Injury in Constitutional Torts, 75 VA. L. REv. 1461 (1989); see 
also State v. Foster, 269 S.C. 373, 237 S.E.2d 589 (1977) (No seizure occured when 
the driver, without prompting by police, stopped his vehicle after seeing that the 
police were following him.). 
235. Identification of a "significant" contribution is judgmental and thereby 
sacrifices the superficial certainty of mechanical concepts of causation or categorical 
rules defining "means intentionally applied." Such judgments are unavoidable, 
however, because "the question of causative relations is in reality one of fact and 
degree." Smith, supra note 200, at 317. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 
U.S. 388, 409 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (Courts are "capable of making the 
types of judgment concerning causation and magnitude of injury necessary to accord 
meaningful compensation for invasion of Fourth Amendment rights."); see also 
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (Determining whether government 
fault is closely related to the ultimate injury is a difficult task, "[b]ut judge and 
jury, doing their respective jobs, will be adequate to the task."). 
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liberty. 236 The proposed standard stops short of a full endorsement 
of the but-for test, but is less restrictive than Brower's categorical 
approach to the cause of a seizure. 237 When confronted with a 
situation like Galas in which the police and the suspect have both 
played a significant role in causing a loss of liberty, the Court should 
not be forced to an all-or-nothing determination as to which actor 
is the cause of an event such as an automobile crash. Instead, the 
Court should recognize that a broad sense of causation identifies 
each actor as a significant contributor to the event. 
Under the proposed standard, the Court would exclude from 
fourth amendment coverage only those absurd cases in which a police 
officer's contribution to the suspect's loss of liberty is de minimis. 238 
In all other instances, the Court would serve the purposes of the 
amendment by reaching another level of inquiry and addressing the 
justification for the chase.239 It is consistent with the fourth amend-
236. The approach suggested in this article is the opposite of the approach 
employed by the Sixth Circuit in Galas. When the Sixth Circuit held that the 
defendant police officer's conduct was not "the proximate cause" of the crash, the 
court opined that "the question of whether defendant's conduct enhanced the 
likelihood of the accident need not be addressed." Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 
202 (6th Cir. 1986). The court of appeals failed to recognize that "when the conduct 
of two or more persons contributes concurrently as proximate causes ... , the 
conduct of each person is a proximate cause regardless of the extent to which each 
contributes .... " People v. Vernon, 89 Cal. App. 3d 853, 864, 152 Cal. Rptr. 
765, 772 (1979). According to the dissent in Tennessee v. Garner, the majority 
opinion implied that the "Fourth Amendment constrains the use of any police 
practice that is potentially lethal, no matter how remote the risk." Garner, 471 U.S. 
at 31. 
237. The proposed standard is more in keeping with the traditional Article Ill 
case-and-controversy requirement under which the alleged injury must be "fairly 
traceable" to the government. Prior to Rakas, the fourth amendment's threshold 
requirement could be spoken of in terms of the Constitution's Article Ill case-and-
controversy requirements for standing. See Simien, The Interrelationship of the 
Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Object to Unreasonable Searches, 
41 ARK. L. REv. 487 (1988). Rakas, however, placed the traditional standing inquiries 
"within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 
140. Thus the search and standing "inquiries merge into one." Rawlings v. Kentucky, 
448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980). The Rakas Court itself asserted that "[w]e can think of 
no decided cases of this Court that would have come out differently ... " under 
the search or standing inquiries. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139. If the Court's statement 
is accurate, the existence of a significant causal connection between the officer's 
action and the suspect's loss of liberty satisfies the traditional standing requirement 
that the alleged injury be "fairly traceable" to the government action. See J. BARRON 
& T. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 24 (1986) (The litigant must 
allege an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the government.); see also City of 
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (Government fault must be "closely related 
to the ultimate injury."). 
238. See supra note 234. 
239. By separating the issue of standing from the merits of the case, the Court 
will be better able to analyze the right of the litigant to proceed with his claim 
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ment's goal of regulating police misconduct240 and with elemental 
notions of fairness to require that one whose conduct contributes to 
another's loss should justify his actions. When called upon to explain 
their role in contributing to a suspect's loss of liberty, the police 
should offer the type of substantive justification recognized by the 
amendment, e.g., that the chase was prompted by probable cause, 
reasonable suspicion, or the like. 241 The existence or absence of a 
constitutionally appropriate justification for police pursuit can be 
brought to light only if the Court brings the chase within the coverage 
of the fourth amendment by broadly interpreting the nature of the 
causal link between the police action and the suspect's reaction. 
If the Court did bring both Brower and Galas within the scope 
of the amendment, the Court would not thereby be trapped into 
punishing the police for accidents because the two cases may still be 
distinguished under the amendment's reasonableness requirement. 242 
Although a significant causal link between police action and a citi-
zen's loss of liberty satifies the threshold requirement of the fourth 
amendment, 243 causation itself is morally neutral. The question of 
wrongful police conduct adds to causation the moral dimension 
essential to a determination of constitutional reasonableness. 244 "It is 
the relation of wrong to injury-not merely the relation of act to 
injury-that justifies constitutional condemnation. " 245 Thus, in 
Brower, the highly foreseeable loss of liberty created by the chase 
and the roadblock may be justified as morally and constitutionally 
reasonable in light of the weighty interest in apprehending fleeing 
felons. 246 In contrast to Brower, it was less foreseeable that the police 
pursuit in Galas would terminate in a fatal crash. Yet, that compar-
atively improbable threat to the suspect's liberty would be morally 
and constitutionally unreasonable if the justification for the chase 
without being prejudiced by the Court's view of the ultimate merits of the claim or 
by its views of the remedy dictated by the exclusionary rule. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 
448 U.S. 98, 111-13 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
240. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); Dunaway v. New York, 442 
U.S. 200 (1979). 
241. "Because many situations which confront officers in the course of exe-
cuting their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some 
mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting 
on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). See also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 
2800 (1990). 
242. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 960 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
243. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1979). 
244. See supra note 242. 
245. See Jeffries, supra note 234, at 1469. 
246. During the oral arguments on Brower, Justice O'Connor suggested that 
the suspect was armed with a deadly weapon in the form of a vehicle, and used it 
in an aggressive and dangerous manner. 44 CRIM. L. REP. at 4150. 
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were nothing more than an intent to harass a black motorist. While 
the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement may be flexible 
enough to distinguish between the crashes in Brower and Galas, both 
crashes should be brought within the scope of the amendment so 
that the Court may inquire into the justification for the chase. 
B. Integrating Causation with Other Threshold 
Requirements for Seizures. 
Applying a broad sense of causation to the scope of the fourth 
amendment, the Court must focus upon three threshold requirements 
for defining a seizure: (1) Has there has been a loss of privacy or 
liberty (the ultimate result with which the amendment is concerned)? 247 
(2) Was there volitional police conduct (a necessary predicate for 
triggering the application of the amendment)? 248 (3) Was there a 
significant connection between the predicate and the result? 249 While 
the first two requirements can be resolved independently of each 
other, the third requirement provides the vital link between police 
conduct and a citizen's loss of privacy or liberty. 
(1) The Loss of Privacy or Liberty 
When discussing the threshold showing of a loss of privacy or 
liberty, the Court has reserved judgment on what appears to be the 
most troubling aspect of the chase cases-the question of whether 
an unsuccessful chase (one not resulting in the suspect's apprehension) 
can ever constitute a seizure.250 This perplexing question, however, 
does not fully address the complexities of the issues raised by the 
chase cases. In a genuinely unsuccessful chase, the police fail to 
apprehend the suspect and fail to recover evidentiary items. Such 
situations do not arise in a criminal proceeding because a completely 
fruitless chase produces no items to be suppressed under the fourth 
amendment's exclusionary rule. 251 Chesternut and Hester demon-
247. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra text accompanying note 5. 
248. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. 
249. Id. 
250. See supra note 85. 
251. Even if the defendant is apprehended, he may not utilize the exclusionary 
rule to gain his release from custody. He may only suppress the fruits of an illegal 
arrest. See Frisbie v. Collins; 342 U.S. 519 (1952). Unlike a criminal prosecution, 
however, a section 1983 suit may raise the unadulterated question of whether a 
wholly unsuccessful chase constitutes a seizure. For example, after successfully 
escaping apprehension, the suspect files a claim for the mental anguish of having 
felt a loss of liberty when the police initiated the chase. See Checki v. Webb, 785 
F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1986) (where the plaintiffs claimed that they were "alarmed" by 
a twenty-mile chase at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour). The court stated that 
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strate, however, that a chase may be partially unsuccessful because 
the police fail to apprehend the suspect but do obtain evidentiary 
items used to incriminate the defendant. 252 
The Chesternut Court overlooked the important distinction be-
tween a seizure of the person and a seizure of property253 because 
the Court limited itself to a consideration of whether the evidentiary 
items produced by the chase should be suppressed as the fruits of 
an illegal seizure of the person. 254 Even assuming that the Chesternut 
Court correctly decided that the chase was not a seizure of the 
person, however, the Court failed to consider whether the chase 
caused a seizure of the suspect's property. That is, was the suspect's 
decision to discard private property a wholly voluntary abandonment 
or one caused by the chase?255 The Chesternut Court ignored the 
possibility that police pursuit falling short of a seizure of the person 
could nonetheless prompt a person to abandon involuntarily his 
expectation of privacy in his property. 
If the Court accords proper attention to the distinction between 
seizures of the person and seizures of property, the threshold question 
of the suspect's loss of privacy or liberty is not dependent upon 
whether a seizure of the person occurs when the police initiate the 
the pursuing officers' actions "crossed the constitutional line that would make their 
pursuit and harassment actionable under section 1983." Id. at 538. But see Garner, 
471 U.S. at 31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Absent apprehension of the suspect, 
there is no 'seizure' for Fourth Amendment purposes."). See Bruce, Emotional 
Distress Claims for Police Misconduct: Does a Cause of Action Exist Under Section 
1983?, 22 VAL U.L. REV. 61 (1987). 
252. See supra notes 42 & 49 and accompanying text. 
253. "Although the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment injunction 
against unreasonable searches is quite different from that protected by its injunction 
against unreasonable seizures, neither the one nor the other is of inferior worth or 
necessarily requires only lesser protection." Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 
(1987) (citation omitted). See also Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2313 (1990) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court today eliminates a rule designed to further 
possessory interests on the ground that it fails to further privacy interests. I cannot 
countenance such constitutional legerdemain."). 
254. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 569-72. 
255. "While it is true that a criminal defendant's voluntary abandonment of 
evidence can remove the taint of an illegal stop or arrest, it is equally true that for 
this to occur the abandonment must be truly voluntary and not merely the product 
of police misconduct." United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726, 729-30 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(citations omitted). See also Smith v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1288 (1990) (The suspect did 
not abandon his paperbag by throwing it onto the hood of his car and turning to 
face an approaching police officer.); In re Hodari D., 216 Cal. App. 3d 745, 265 
Cal. Rptr. 79 (Ct. App. 1989) (The pursuing police officer caused the suspect to 
abandon his property.). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to consider 
the question: "May a citizen who is pursued by a police officer on a public street 
immunize himself from prosecution by discarding incriminating evidence and by 
asserting that he did so out of fear of unlawful search?" California v. Hodari D., 
Ill S. Ct. 38 (1990). 
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chase or only when the police apprehend the suspect. While the 
Court may continue to struggle with defining the precise point at 
which a seizure of the person occurs,256 the threshold showing of a 
seizure of property257 will be more apparent when the defendant 
discards evidentiary items. In such situations, the defendant must 
establish only that at some point he had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the discarded property and that the expectation was 
subsequently lost. 258 Then the Court can address the remaining thresh-
old question: Was the loss of privacy caused by government conduct259 
or by the defendant's autonomous decision to abandon the prop-
erty?260 
(2) Government Conduct 
After successfully establishing that he suffered a loss of privacy 
or liberty, the defendant must meet the second threshold requirement 
for a seizure by pointing to some volitional conduct on the part of 
government agents. 261 This factor should be readily apparent in most 
cases. This article's second hypothetical262 illustrates, however, that 
in unusual situations the police may be mere instrumentalities of 
willful acts performed by a non-government agent. If the Court does 
confront a case in which there is no volitional police conduct, the 
fourth amendment would be inapplicable. 
(3) The Causal Link 
When the defendant successfully establishes both a loss of privacy 
or liberty263 and the existence of volitional conduct by government 
agents, 264 only the question of causation265 remains to fully satisfy 
the threshold for invoking fourth amendment protections. Despite 
Brower's focus on intentional causes,266 this article suggests that the 
amendment requires an objective and legally significant connection 
between police conduct and the suspect's loss of privacy or liberty. 
In the context of a traditional causation analysis, the but-for test267 
256. See supra note 251. 
257. See supra note 253. 
258. Id. 
259. See supra text accompanying note 250. 
260. See supra text accompanying note 253. 
261. See supra note 90. 
262. See supra text accompanying note 104. 
263. See supra text accompanying note 247. 
264. See supra note 90. 
265. See supra text accompanying notes 90 & 255: 
266. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81. 
267. See supra text accompanying note 197. 
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may disclose the most obvious failures to establish an objective causal 
link, e.g., the situation in which an arrest warrant is issued in New 
York at the same time that the suspect surrenders in California. 268 
Focusing on the requirement for a legally significant connection 
between the chase and a loss of liberty allows the Court to adjust 
mechanical rules of causation in such a way as to serve the funda-
mental purposes of the amendment269 that are not served by focusing 
upon a police officer's intent270 or upon formalistic determinations 
of the cause of the citizen's loss of liberty.271 
C. Beyond the Threshold 
If there are affirmative answers to the above questions regarding 
a loss of liberty, the existence of volitional police conduct, and a 
significant connection between the police conduct and the loss of 
liberty,272 the Court should recognize that the threshold requirements 
for invoking the fourth amendment have been satisfied. Then the 
Court should move on to address the substantive question of whether 
a specific seizure caused by police pursuit is constitutionally reason-
able. 273 
When determining the reasonableness of the seizure, the Court 
can revisit and weigh the initial threshold questions as part of the 
substantive balancing process that determines constitutional reason-
ableness. 274 For example, although both Chesternut and Garner may 
involve a loss of liberty sufficient to trigger application of the fourth 
amendment, 275 the extent of the suspect's loss of liberty ranges from 
the discomfort caused by a police car driving alongside a pedestrian276 
to the loss of life resulting from an officer's firing a fatal shot at a 
suspect.277 Under the balancing test of reasonableness, 278 the Court 
would attach varying weights to the vastly different infringements 
upon liberty that occured in cases such as Chesternut and Garner. 
268. See supra text accompanying note 267. 
269. The requirement for a significant causal connection also precludes ex-
tending the amendment to situations in which the suspect responds to a chase in an 
irrational or absurd fashion. See supra note 234. 
270. See supra pp. 86-88, 90-91. 
271. See supra pp. 88-91. 
272. See supra pp. 110-13. 
273. See supra text accompanying notes 256-62. 
274. The goal of balancing is to directly correlate the importance of the 
government interest with the severity of the intrusion upon individual interests in 
privacy and liberty. Bacigal, supra note 215, at 803. See also supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. 
275. See supra text accompanying notes 38-56. 
276. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 569. 
277. Garner, 471 U.S. at 4. 
278. Id. at 7-8. 
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When the Court confronts situations in which there is an equiv-
alent loss of liberty, the situations must still be measured by the 
degree of foreseeability that the loss of liberty would occur. 279 For 
example, the positioning of a roadblock around a blind curve and 
the use of headlights to blind a motorist280 would make the crash 
into the roadblock more foreseeable than the motorist's losing control 
of his vehicle. 281 When the relation between the harm risked and the 
injury caused is expressed in terms of foreseeability, the more fore-
seeable consequences in Brower, for example, would figure more 
prominently in the Court's balancing test for reasonableness. 
In addition to evaluating the extent of the suspect's loss of liberty 
and the (oreseeability of that loss, the Court must evaluate the degree 
of justification for a police officer's conduct. In Brower, probable 
cause to believe that the suspect committed a felony constituted 
ample justification for some form of police pursuit. 282 Less weight 
should be accorded to the justification that existed in Chesternut, 283 
and perhaps negative weight should be assigned to situations in which 
a police officer initiates a chase as a means of harassing black 
citizens. 284 
As the above examples demonstrate, redirecting the Court's focus 
from the threshold question of the amendment's coverage to the 
substantive question of reasonableness will not precipitate a bright-
line rule governing the chase cases. The variable weights that the 
Court would utilize in determining the reasonableness of a police 
279. See supra pp. 86, 88, 90. 
280. See supra note 60. 
281. Galas, 801 F.2d at 202. 
282. The particular method of pursuit, e.g., high-speed pursuit or "dead man" 
roadblocks, also affects the reasonableness of the seizure. As Brower noted, "the 
circumstances of this roadblock, including the allegation that headlights were used 
to blind the oncoming driver, may yet determine the outcome of this case." 489 
U.S. at 599. See also Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 721 F. Supp. 189, 195 (E.D. 
Ark. 1989) ("At some point, continued pursuit at high speeds in heavy traffic might 
rise to the level of recklessness."). 
283. In Chesternut, the police justified pursuit on the ground that they wanted 
to see where the suspect was going. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 569. 
284. Confronted with a factual situation akin to Chesternut, the New York 
Court of Appeals stated that: 
(T]he basic purpose of the constitutional protections against unlawful 
searches and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and security of each and 
every person against all arbitrary intrusions by government. Therefore, any 
time an intrusion on the security and privacy of the individual is undertaken 
with intent to harass or is based upon mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, 
the spirit of the Constitution has been violated .... 
People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y. 2d 210, 217, 352 N.E.2d 562, 567-68, 386 N.Y.S.2d 
375, 380-81 (1976). See also State v. Saia, 302 So. 2d 869, 873 (La. 1974) ("Police 
officers cannot actively create 'street encounters' unless they have knowledge of 
suspicious facts and circumstances sufficient to allow them to infringe on the 
suspect's right to be free from governmental interference."). 
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pursuit will certainly. keep the mystery in the fourth amendment. 285 
What is to be gained, however, is that the Court's dialogue on the 
amendment will rise to a higher level when the Court addresses more 
readily the reasonableness of police pursuit. A comparison of the 
opinions in Garner and Brower illustrates the quality of that dialogue. 
After quickly passing over the threshold question of defining_ a seizure 
in Garner,286 the Justices displayed a willingness to address the 
appropriate balance between the competing societal interests in per~ 
sonal liberty and effective law enforcement. 287 The societal interests 
that figured so prominently in Garner were all but obscured by 
Brower's musings over far-fetched hypotheticals and formalistic con-
cepts of causation and means intentionally applied. 288 The Court's 
reliance on narrow and formalistic causation theories to resolve fourth 
amendment issues should be abandoned in favor of a constitutional 
view of causation broad enough to facilitate the identification and 
evaluation of the competing societal interests that the Court must 
take into account when interpreting the fourth amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
The principal lesson of Terry is twofold: (1) a sliding scale of 
constitutional reasonableness allows the Court some flexibility when 
balancing competing societal interests; and (2) the admittedly inexact 
balancing process is pref er able to a rigid delineation that forces the 
Court's analysis of the fourth amendment into all-or-nothing deter-
minations. In light of the flexibility of the amendment's reasonable-
ness requirement,289 there is little justification for the Court's insistence 
upon a grudging and rigid interpretation of the causal link between 
police pursuit and the suspect's loss of liberty.290 The Court, because 
of its narrow view of causation, is forced to select either the suspect 
or the police as the cause of the suspect' s loss of liberty. By recreating 
the type of rigid demarcation discarded in Terry, the Court has 
unnecessarily limited the scope of the fourth amendment. 291 
285. Interpretation of the fourth amendment "is inescapably judgmental" and 
in "the pans of judgment sit imponderable weights." Amsterdam, supra note 212, 
at 353-54. 
286. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 7. 
287. See id. at 7-8. 
288. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97. Current fourth amendment law has 
created an ironic situation in which the threshold requirement for a search or seizure 
is now less clear than the substantive requirement of reasonableness. See Cun-
ningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of "Search" in the Fourth Amend-
ment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA L. REv. 541, 606 n.397 (1988). 
289. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
290. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
291. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
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In the wake of Terry and Katz, the Court has continually broad-
ened the amendment's reasonableness requirement to correlate the 
degree of intrusion upon privacy and liberty with the degree of 
justification for the intrusion. 292 The Court should likewise broaden 
the scope of the amendment to take account of both the suspect's 
and the government's degree of contribution to the suspect's loss of 
liberty. In place of categorical distinctions between intentional and 
accidental seizures293 or between seizures solely attributable to the 
police or the suspect, 294 the Court should examine the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether a police officer's conduct signif-
icantly contributed to a citizen's loss of liberty. 
292. Although Terry and its progeny "scaled down" the level of justification 
for a CQnstitutional search or seizure, Winston v. Lee demonstrated that a scaled 
approach to reasonableness could produce a decision favoring a heightened protection 
of privacy and liberty. 470 U.S. 753 (1985). See Bacigal, Dodging a Bullet, but 
Opening Old Wounds in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 
597 (1986). 
293. See Winston, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). 
294. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
